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Taking Federalism Seriously: Lopez and the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act
DAVID B. KOPEL

& GLENN H. REYNOLDS"

As has been the case for decades, the issue of abortion continues to
inspire political battles and proposals for legislative and constitutional
change.

But the ritualized debate over the subject has missed an im-

portant development: since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
United States v. Lopez,' it is now reasonable to ask where Congress

might get the power to regulate abortion in the first place. Lopez, after
all, underscored the point that our federal government is a limited one,
restricted to those powers enumerated under the Constitution. Under
the plain logic of Lopez, the argument for a congressional power to
regulate abortion under the Interstate Commerce Clause seems dubious

at best.
That the question of congressional power has not been
asked-much less answered-raises important questions about the seriousness of those in Congress (chiefly, but not exclusively, Republicans)
who have promised a return to principles of limited government, but
who nonetheless endorsed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.' Perhaps
their commitment to limited government is less deep than it seems.

Just as surprisingly, the fiercest opponents of the Partial-Birth Abortion

* Research Director, Independence Institute. Golden, Colo.. <http:/i2Lorg>; J.D. 1935.
University of Michigan; B.A. in History 1982. Brois?? University.
The authors would like to thank Don Kates. Jeremy Rabkn, Don Regan. Eugene Volokh,
Jeffrey A. Yerkes, and Scott Wallace for their helpful comments on this manuscript; and Roger
Pilon, Brannon Denning, Timothy Lynch, Fran Ansley. and Robert Aferges for some enlightening conversations on this subject. Errors are entirely the responsIbllity of sinister unlaoi' forces, not the authors.
** Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law J.D. 1985. Yale Lawv School.
BA. 1982, University of Tennessee.
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Ban Act have not raised what may be a winning Constitutional issue,
but have instead fought the issue exclusively on policy grounds.3 Perhaps there is a reluctance to address the scope of congressional power
in this context because the opponents of the law are, on most other issues, advocates of greatly expanded federal power.
In this Article, we take up the issue that lies ignored: whether the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act falls within the constitutional powers of
Congress. The analysis of congressional power to use the Commerce
Clause to outlaw partial-birth abortion has, however, implications far
beyond the prohibition of a single type of abortion procedure. The
analysis is directly applicable to almost any other form of congressional
restriction on abortion. And the analysis also bears on congressional
power to enact various other prohibitions, such as the 1986 prohibition
on simple possession of machine guns.
We assume that the Lopez case is not an aberration: rather, Lopez
stands for the principle that the Constitutional grant to Congress of the
power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several States" was not
the same as a grant of power to Congress "to regulate on any subject it
chooses," and enforcement of this provision of the Constitution is just
as much a proper duty of the courts as enforcing any other provision
of the Constitution.4 After all, even the greatest advocate of national
power in the founding era, Alexander Hamilton, insisted that the judicial branch should declare unconstitutional the exercise of ungranted

3. For example, some Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act opponents have claimed the fetus is
rendered unconscious by the application of anesthesia to the mother. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc,
HI1611 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). No anesthesiologists supported this statement, and several prominent ones contradicted it. See Frederica MathewesGreen, They Make It Sound So Ugly, HErERODOXY, May/June 1996, at 12 (Robert White, Dir. of
Neurosurgery and Brain Research at Case Western Reserve School of Medicine; Prof. Jean

Wright, Assoc. Prof. of Pediatrics and Anesthesia, Emory School of Medicine).

When Presi-

dent Clinton vetoed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act because it did not include an exception

for health-related abortions, he surrounded himself with women who had undergone third trimester abortions for plainly legitimate health reasons; but it later turned out that none of these
women may have undergone a type of abortion that would be controlled by the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act. See id. at 15.
4. But see Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce
Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 719, 769-71 (1996). Graglia argues that there is no judicially enforceable practical limit to congressional power; state autonomy should instead be protected by

overturning allegedly overbroad readings of the Fourteenth Amendment which interfere with
state autonomy. One limitation of Graglia's reasoning is that it treats. the limitation of congressional power as .a concern solely relevant to states' rights. To the contrary, limitations on
federal power are also important protectors of fundamental liberties. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 552 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
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powers by the legislative branch. 5
Our focus here is primarily on Lopez and the post-Lopez cases,

since, as Justice Stephen Breyer noted in his Lopez dissent, the majority's opinion is inconsistent with prior Commerce Clause jurisprudence,

even if Lopez did not formally overrule any prior case.6 Also in dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens was not entirely out of bounds to char-

acterize the Lopez holding as "radical." 7 At the same time, we do not
attempt to make Lopez more than it currently is; if Lopez marks the

first battle of a coming judicial revolution, we will evaluate the proposed law in light of the Constitutional territory that has been demarcated so far, not in light of territory still to be contested, although we
do discuss where the boundary should be drawn in the future.
We do not address other issues that may also be relevant to the

constitutionality of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act: whether section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment may grant Congress power to enact
such a law;8 whether the Tenth Amendment reserves control over medical procedures to the states;9 whether the arguably vague language of
5. Hamilton insisted that
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their
own powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other
departments it may be answered that this cannot be the natural presumption where it
is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution.. . .It is far
more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be
regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the
legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the
two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the
intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed, 1961).
6. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 625 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Bennett L Gershman.
Judicial 'Conservatism', N.Y. LJ., June 21, 1995 ("In Lope=, the Court may have uprooted
nearly 60 years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.").
7. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8.In light of the Court's recent decision that Congress may not expand the boundaries of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the issue of whether the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is a valid
exercise of congressional powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment is the same
as whether the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act violates the Supreme Court's guarantees of a
right to abortion. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S.CL 2157, 2172 (1997) (Congress exceeded scope of its enforcement power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)). But see Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1966) (section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is appropriate congressional legislation under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
9. The Tenth Amendment is indirectly implicated in the Kennedy-O'Connor Lope: concur-
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the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act could cover many ordinary second
trimester abortions, and thereby violate Roe v. Wade; 0 whether the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act would be void under Roe v. Wade because
it bars abortion procedures that a woman's doctor believes to be the
best way to protect her health;" and whether there is a rational basis

for outlawing a single method of late-term abortion which may be less
likely than a still-legal method to produce sterility or death in the
mother.2

Our inquiry examines the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act from the
perspectives of the Court's majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrence, and Justice Thomas's concurrence.

We then turn to the lower

court decisions implementing Lopez. While some scholars have predicted that Lopez would have little effect in the lower courts, 3 Lopez has
rence. See text infra note 54.
10. See 141 CONG. REC. HI1611 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Schroeder,
submitting into the record a statement by Dr. Bruce Ferguson of the New Mexico Medical
Group, Albuquerque, N.M.); Warren M. Hem, Abortion Bill Skips the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 1997, at A19 (expert in late-term abortions details how the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act leaves the legal status of many types of abortion unclear). Cf Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1976) (ban on saline amniocentesis for abortion during second
trimester is unconstitutional, because alternative methods are relatively unavailable), But see
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-79 (1992) (upholding various abortion restrictions as long -,s they do not impose an "undue burden" on the right to abortion).
11. The fet': dies anyway if another abortion method is chosen, and the physicians performing partial-birth abortions believe that the procedure is the best alternative for maternal health
in the circumstances. (If they did not, they would be guilty of malpractice.) See generally
Angela Bonavoglia, Separating Fact from Fiction, Ms., May/June 1997, at 54. Other physicians argue that such abortions are never medically necessary. See 141 CONG. REC. H11606
(daily ed. Nov. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady); Mathewes-Green, supra note 3, at 15
(statements of Dr. Pamela Smith, director of medical education at Mt. Sinai Hospital, Chicago;
Dr. Warren Hem, Boulder, Colorado, "would dispute any statement that this is the safest procedure to use").
12. The standard alternative is to give the fetus a lethal injection, and then deliver it dead.
In some cases, the fetus may be removed via a caesarean section (hysterotomy). See Eric
Zorn, Identifying Issues in Abortion Debate Points to a Trap, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 1996, at 1.
A C-section creates a uterine scar, which increases the risk of uterine rupture during a future
pregnancy or delivery. See generally 141 CONG. REC. HI1610 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (reading statements of physicians).
According to the National Abortion Federation, partial-birth abortion also reduces maternal
blood loss; reduces the risk of cervical or uterine damage (thereby allowing the mother the
possibility of a future healthy pregnancy); and allows removal of an intact fetus so that geneticists, pathologists, and perinatologists can study the fetus's problems, and thereby offer more
accurate advice to the mother about future pregnancies and how to prevent future fetal development problems. "Further, it allows the family to have a more complete grieving process for
the loss of a wanted pregnancy, by being able to hold their baby and say goodbye." Robert
Bitonte, Medical Issues-Intact Dilation and Evacuation (visited Mar. 28, 1997), <http://www.prochoice.org/naf/map.map>.
13. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 692 (1995) (recent post-
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led to serious questioning and, in some cases, overturning of federal
laws by the lower courts. We explore these lower court decisions in
detail, to see how far the Lopez revolution has already gone, and where
it might lead.
Before turning to Lopez and its implications, however, let us first
set forth the relevant provisions of the proposed Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act.
The introductory clause of the first sentence of the proposed law is:
"Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion . .. ."" The bill goes on
to specify criminal and civil penalties, and to define "partial-birth abortion.""s The focus of this Article is whether, under existing Constitutional doctrine, the introductory clause sets up an impossible condition:
After Lopez, can a court legitimately hold that a particular abortion
procedure, performed at a clinic in a single state, is "in or affecting"
interstate commerce?
The various factual disputes concerning partial-birth abortion, such
as whether the fetus feels pain, or whether a significant number of such
abortions are procured for trivial reasons,"' are not relevant to answering the interstate commerce question, and will be ignored for this Article." About 5,000 partial birth abortions may be performed each year
in the United States, usually after the twentieth week of pregnancy.'

Lopez federal court decisions "confirm my prediction that Lopez rests on a combination of
unusual circumstances that will lead to the judicial invalidation of few statutes").
14. H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. § 2(a) (1996).
15. Id.
16. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act covers abortions in the second and third trimesters.
Almost all abortions performed in the third trimester are because of serious health risks to the
mother, or severe fetal abnormality. Many late second-trimester abortions are for emotional or
other reasons not related to matemal or fetal physical health. See 141 Co.NG. REc. HI1606
(dally ed. Nov. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady).
17. Abortion providers commonly refer to the procedure as an "intact dilation and evacuation" (IDE). "D&X" is an alternative shorthand. In most abortions, the fetus is "broken" %%hile
inside the uterus, and then removed through a dilated cervix. In an IDE, the fetus is left
intact, and partially brought through the cervix, feet-first. Because the head is too large to
pass through the cervix, a needle is inserted in the fetus's head, and crebrospinal fluid is
removed, in order to shrink the head sufficiently to allow it to pass through the cervix.
We do not use the IDE term in this Article, because the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
bans most but not all IDEs. In some IDEs, the fetus may be killed (or may die) in utero,
and then can be removed through the IDE procedure. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act does
not cover such procedures. See generally National Right to Life Committee, Is There a Afore
'Objective' Term for the Procedure than 'Partial-Bird Abortion' (visited OcL 13, 1997)
<http:l/www.nrlc.orglabortionlpbafactl4.html>.
18. See Carol Byme, Comments on Late Term Abortions Reverberate, (Mtr.EAPOLIS) STAR-
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Thus, partial-birth abortions account for a small fraction of the hundreds of thousands of abortions performed annually in the United
States.
We will first sketch the analytical framework created by Lopez.
We will then apply that framework, together with later lower court
cases applying Lopez, to determine whether the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act is a legitimate exercise of the interstate commerce power. We
conclude with some thoughts regarding legitimacy, at both the legislative and judicial level.
I.

THE LOPEZ OPINION

A. The Opinion of the Court
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that
when using the interstate commerce power, Congress can regulate three
different fields:
1. Use of channels of interstate commerce (e.g., preventing
"immoral" objects from being shipped interstate);
2. Instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including persons or
things in interstate commerce (e.g., imposing safety regulations
on aircraft);
3. Activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.' 9
The Lopez case involved simple possession of a firearm within the
1000-foot federally designated "Gun-Free School Zone." Since all parties agreed that the first and second forms of the interstate commerce
power were irrelevant to the case at hand, the Court analyzed the law
regarding "substantial effects."
1. Substantial Effects
Although some cases had stated that a slight effect, or a possible
effect, of something on interstate commerce would be sufficient for
Congress to be able to use the interstate commerce power, the majority
TRWB., Mar. 1, 1997, at IA (discussing statement by Ron Fitzsimmons, executive director of the
National Coalition of Abortion Providers, claiming there are 5,000 partial-birth abortions per
year). But see Franklin Foer, Abortion Apostate, SLATE (last modified March 8, 1997)
<httpJ/www.slate.com/HeyWait/97-03-08/HeyWait.asp> (no one really knows how many partialbirth abortions are performed).
19. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
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held that other cases, requiring that the object of legislation must "substantially" affect interstate commerce, set the proper standard.2" Quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,2 ' the Court reiterated that
the scope of the interstate commerce power "must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may
not be extended so to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized government."
The majority then identified three problems with the federal GunFree School Zones Act, all of which contributed to the majority's holding that the Act was not a proper exercise of the interstate commerce
power. It should be noted that the Court did not state that these three
defects were the only three possible defects, or that the three defects
were elements in a three-part test.
First, gun possession in a school zone "has nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise."
The Court quoted
Chief Justice Marshall's expansive definition of commerce in Gibbons
v. Ogden,24 the first case to allow use of the interstate commerce power
to regulate intrastate activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more-it
is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations,
and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing
rules for carrying on that intercourse." s
At first glance, it would seem that abortion clinics are a "commercial enterprise," since they provide services in exchange for money.
(One of the pre-Lopez cases found that "commerce" includes medical
26
services to members of a health cooperative.)
On the other hand, private schools (which were included under the

20. See id. at 559.
21. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
22. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. Cf Jones Mcritt, supra note 13, at 679 ("substantial effect"
standard is similar to "proximate cause" in tort law).
23. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
25. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553.

26. See American Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943) (antitrust suit
under section three of the Sherman Act; Court held that the services of a medical cooperative
placed it under the Sherman Act's understanding of "commerce").
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federal "Gun Free School Zones" law) are certainly businesses; they
provide a service for which they charge a fee, and compete among
themselves for customers." Indeed, the district court decision upholding the school zone law stated that "the 'business' of elementary, middle and high schools . . . affects interstate commerce."2' 8 We will return to the "commercial/non-commercial" analysis later, following the
discussion of post-Lopez lower court decisions.
In contrast to the other two defects identified in the Gun-Free
School Zones Act, the "non-commercial" defect is fatal. If an activity
is non-commercial, then it cannot pass the "substantial effects" test,
since that test is limited only to intrastate commercial activities.29 "The
'affecting commerce' test was developed . . . to define the extent of
Congress's power over purely intrastate commercial activities that nonetheless have substantial interstate effects." 30
The Court acknowledged that the commercial/non-commercial distinction "may in some cases result in legal uncertainty,"' and the distinction has been criticized as incoherent by some commentators.32 Our
main purpose in this Article, however, is not to improve Lopez, but to
test its implications for the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.
The second defect in the Gun-Free School Zones Act was that there
was "no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-bycase inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce."3 3 The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act has no such defect.
It explicitly requires that the abortion in question be "in or affecting
interstate commerce." ' 4 The Lopez majority decision contrasted the
Gun-Free School Zones Act with the Gun Control Act of 1968, whose
language banning firearms possession by convicted felons has jurisdic-

27. Some analysts would also classify the government schools as a business, albeit a business which enjoys numerous competitive advantages resulting from quasi-monopoly status. For
purposes of this Article, we need not enter that debate, since private schools are so obviously a

business.
28. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing the district court
decision).
29. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
30. United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995).
31. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
32. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MiCH. L. REv. 554, 564-65 (1995).
33. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. "[Tjhere is no indication that he [Lopez] had recently moved
in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any

concrete tie to interstate commerce."

Id. at 567.

34. H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. § 2(a) (1996).
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tional language similar to the jurisdictional language in the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act. 5
The final defect of the Gun-Free School Zones Act was that there
was no legislative history or finding about the relationship of conduct
to interstate commerce. Although congressional findings are not mandatory, the Court observed that "to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though
no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking
here.

36

The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act contains no such findings, nor
do committee reports on the bill. When the House of Representatives
debated the bill, not one proponent of the bill even uttered the words
"interstate commerce," let alone offered any rationale connecting the
bill with the congressional power to regulate commerce among the several states. 37 Although courts must uphold a congressional determination about substantial effects on interstate commerce if there is a "rational basis,"3' the test is no longer a free pass.39 As the Lopez majority
stated, "[S]imply because Congress may conclude a particular activity
substantially effects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so."' For "[Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce
sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and
can be settled finally only by this Court.''
2. General Principlesfrom Lopez

Several important analytical rules were established in Lopez. First,
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994). Section 922(g) states: "It shall be unlawful [for certain
specified persons] . ..to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
36. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
37. See 141 CONG. REC. H11604-18 (daily ed. Nov. 1,1995).
38. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363 (5th Cir. 1993).
39. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (holding state prohibition on local
gay rights ordinances lacks a rational basis); Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.. 610
(1986) (deciding federal regulations to require non-discriminatory treatment of handicapped newboms lack a rational basis); Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding no
rational basis for zoning decision).
40. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,concurring)).
41. Id. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black,
J., concurring)).
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adding up every instance of an activity that has no or little effect on
interstate commerce, and concluding that the aggregation has a "substantial effect," and therefore that the individual instances can be regulated under the interstate commerce power, is no longer sufficient. The
aggregation of individual effects into a "substantial" whole "may not be
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect
and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society,
would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is national and
'
The
what is local and create a completely centralized government."42
interstate commerce impact of the aggregate activity must genuinely be
substantial, for Congress may not "use a relatively trivial impact on
commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private
activities. '43
Aggregation had been allowed in the Depression era case of
Wickard v. Filburn," (characterized by the Lopez majority as "perhaps
the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity")," which involved a federal plan to set up agricultural cartels. A farmer's growing of wheat for home consumption was
held to be within the scope of the interstate commerce power, since the
sum of all crops grown for home consumption had a major effect on
interstate demand for wheat.46 (Wheat crops such as Mr. Wickard's,
grown for home consumption, constituted twenty percent of the national
wheat crop.)47
Control of gun possession, wrote Chief Justice
Rehnquist, is unlike control of wheat production, for it "is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated." '
By implication, then, if Congress in the Wickard case had banned
the cultivation of wheat for personal consumption, while leaving un-

42. Id. at 557 (quoting NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
43. Id. at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)).
44. 317 U.S. III (1942).

45. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
46. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 112.

47. See id. at 127. See generally BOB DYLAN, Union Sundown, on INFIDELS (Columbia Records 1983) ("I can see the day coming when even your home garden is gonna be against the

law").
48. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Author., 469

U.S. 528, 584-85 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (regulation of intrastate commerce allowed
only to extent that it is "necessary and proper" to regulation of interstate commerce); Randy E.
Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. Rav. 745, 768-71 (1997) (elaborating application
of "necessary and proper" clause to interstate commerce issues).
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touched all sales of wheat, including sales in interstate commerce, the
law would have been unconstitutional. The control of Mr. Wickard's
food, rather than being a part of a larger scheme to control interstate
commerce, would have stood alone as a prohibition on simple intrastate
activity. The Lopez majority's explication of Wickard casts serious
doubt on the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. The Act is not part of
general regulation of interstate medical services, but instead a prohibition on a single type of medical procedure.
The second analytic principle that Lopez offers is one this Article
calls the "non-infinity principle." In other words, for a Commerce
Clause rationale to be acceptable under Lopez, it must not be a rationale that would allow Congress to legislate on everything. In a sense,
this principle is a restatement of the holding of Lopez, since the case
holds that the commerce power is not unbounded." As Deborah Jones
Merritt notes, the Lopez majority opinion is an explicit rebuke to the
previous conventional wisdom regarding the Commerce Clause. Merritt
points out that the intellectual gyrations that the Supreme Court had
performed in upholding congressional power since the New Deal had
seriously damaged the credibility of the Constitution and the Court:
[T]he Commerce Clause had become an intellectual joke among
academics and attorneys. A Constitution that is subject to ridicule, however, serves no one's interests. No one will take the
Constitution seriously if Congress and the Courts refuse to do
so. For these reasons, the Supreme Court concluded in Lopez
that rationales expounding congressional power under the Commerce Clause must have some limit.5"
The "non-infinity principle" was applied by the majority to reject
the government's rationale that the cost of crime, in the aggregate, has
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, or that poor quality education (caused, in theory, by guns coming within 1,000 feet of a school)
reduces economic productivity:
We pause to consider the implications of the Government's
arguments. The Government admits, under its "costs of crime"
49. The principle is not novel to Lope. As Justice Frankfurter stated in a majority opinion,
"[s]cholastic reasoning may prove that no activity is isolated within the boundaries of a single
state, but that cannot justify absorption of legislation power by the United States over every
activity." Polish Nat'! Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 650 (1944).
50. Jones Merritt, supra note 13, at 691. Notably, the dissent agrees with this core holding
that the commerce power is finite. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 623 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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reasoning, that Congress could regulate not only all violent
crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Similarly, under the Government's "national productivity" reasoning, Congress could regulate any
activity that it found was related to the economic productivity
of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce,
and child custody), for example. Under the theories that the
Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to
perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically
have been sovereign.
Thus, if we were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.
Although Justice Breyer argues that acceptance of the
Government's rationales would not authorize a general federal
police power, he is unable to identify any activity that the
States may regulate but Congress may not. Justice Breyer
posits that there might be some limitations on Congress' commerce power such as family law or certain aspects of education.
Post, at 1661-62. These suggested limitations, when viewed in
light of the dissent's expansive analysis, are devoid of substance. 5 1

The majority's "non-infinity principle" suggests that the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act may have severe problems under Lopez. If a ban on
one particular type of medical procedure is valid, then it is surely within the power of Congress to outlaw chiropractic, acupuncture, rolfing,
or any other medical procedure.52 Or conversely, to mandate that those
procedures be used instead of more conventional medical procedures.53
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas all joined in the majority

51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65.
52. There may a Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment argument to be made about the right to
choose one's own form of medical treatment.

53. The extent to which abortion in general or partial-birth abortion in particular may be
said to be significantly more interstate in character than other medical procedures is discussed
in Part II.A.5.
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opinion, which, of course, sets the legal standard to be applied. In
addition, Justices Thomas and Kennedy each %vrotea concurrence, with

Justice O'Connor joining the latter. Each concurrence raised important
questions, which we now summarize and address.
1. Areas of the Traditional State Concern

Raising concerns that might have been better discussed in the context of the Tenth Amendment, rather than the Commerce Clause, Justice Kennedy explained that the role of the Court is to "inquire whether

the exercise of national power intrudes upon an area of traditional state
concern."54 In the case of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, "it is well

established that education is a traditional concern of the States.

55

Likewise, despite the much decried modem trend toward federalizing

criminal law, crime control is an area of traditional state concern.56
The Lopez majority stated that Congress cannot legislate against purely
local crime.5 7 The Lopez majority likewise stated that law enforcement

and education were areas "where States traditionally have been sovereign," and that Commerce Clause interpretations that allowed federal

control were ipso jure wrong. 58
Even Justice Breyer in dissent acknowledged that there are some

issues, traditionally associated with state control, that are beyond the
scope of the interstate commerce power;, the commerce power does not
permit the Federal Government to regulate "marriage, divorce and child
'
custody."59
This determination was, in fact, a unanimous conclusion of

the entire Court, for the majority pointedly rejected the government's

54. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The concurrence is consistent with
the Court's decision in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), which held that an otherwise valid exercise of federal power is void under the Tenth Amendment if it intrudes into an
area of traditional state concern. See id. at 3.
55. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580.
56. Even before Lopez, the Court had emphasized that criminal law is a traditional state

issue. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 128 (1982) ("The States possess primary power for defining and enforcing the criminal
law")); United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973) (quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (finding federal criminalization effects a "change in the sensitive
relation between state and federal criminal jurisdiction")); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945) (reversing judgment affirming federal conviction of local law enforcement officers).
57. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
58. See id. Cf. William G. Scott, Comment, Federal Jurisdiction Under the Hobbs Act
Satisfied by Showing PotentialEffect on Commerce, 28 VAND. L REV. 1348, 1359 (1975) ("full
commerce power in a criminal context historically has never been commensurate with the wider
scope of commerce power in the economic realm").
59. Lopez, 541 U.S. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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economic productivity rationale for the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
since that rationale could allow federal control of "family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody).""0
Lopez does not, however, provide a framework for deciding whether a particular topic falls within "an area of traditional concern."
Whatever it takes for an area to qualify as one of "traditional state
concern," the prerequisite is not a near-complete absence of prior federal activity (as is the case with divorce law). The federal government
spends billions of dollars per year on aid to local education, runs a
Department of Education, and uses the spending power to coerce local
schools into following rigid federal standards regarding disciplinary
policies and other day-to-day operational issues. In the criminal field,
there are literally thousands of federal criminal laws, reaching down to
standards for who may own what type of drug, and criminalizing simple possession of tiny quantities of controlled substances. Nevertheless,
the Kennedy/O'Connor concurrence and majority both stated that education and crime were areas of traditional state concern.
In the field of medicine, the federal Medicaid and Medicare programs impose extensive controls on patients and doctors who participate
in these programs, including detailed regulation of data collection and
reporting; the federal government also heavily subsidizes medical education, and some federal laws impose quality standards on some lab tests
or other procedures. But it is difficult to argue that all the federal
intrusions into local medical policy are greater than intrusions into
local education or local crime control.
With the unanimous Court agreeing that family law is a traditional
area of state concern over which the interstate commerce power cannot
extend, the way is certainly open for the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
to be questioned as an illegitimate federal effort to control traditional
state issues of medical care and family law.6
2. Stability and Reliance
The Kennedy concurrence, in words quoted by many lower federal
courts striving to uphold various federal laws post-Lopez, states that
"the Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an
immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as

60. Id. at 564.
61. Cf. 141 CONG. REC. H11597 (1995) (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("How else can we explain a bill that would-for the very first time-federalize the regulation of abortion, a matter
traditionally left to the discretion of the States?").
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it has evolved to this point."62 Justice Kennedy's concerns are misplaced, however, for the interest in stable Commerce Clause jurisprudence is far less than in other fields in which the Court has not hesitated to reverse wrongly decided precedent. Although one need not take
the interstate commerce power back to 1936 in order to find serious
problems with the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, it is worth exploring
the stability issue, because it plays so large a role in lower court underenforcement of Lopez.
Stability is of little value in constitutional jurisprudence, if stability
requires a continuation of errors from a previous era. The relative unimportance of stability is taught to most law students before they even
take their first Constitutional Law class; no more than a few weeks of
law school have passed for most first-year law students before they
learn in Civil Procedure that in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,63 the
Court obliterated a century's worth of "federal common law" which had
become deeply embedded in the American legal system. As Justice
Brandeis wrote for the Erie majority, "no lapse of time" should make
the Court "hesitate to correct" what is recognized to be "an unconstitutional assumption of power."
Similarly, in NS v. Chadha,' the Court
was willing to overturn over a hundred federal statutes in a single
stroke, when the Court vindicated the separation of powers by finding
the legislative veto unconstitutional.
In Chadha, the Court determined that the stability of over a hundred laws was less important than the fundamental constitutional principle of inter-branch separation of powers. Separation of powers between
the federal and state governments is no less important than separation
of powers within the federal government, Erie teaches. If a hundred
laws must fall to maintain the separation, then the laws should fall,
Chadha teaches.
If previous Courts have failed to enforce rigorously various
protections of Constitutional freedom, then the duty of the current
Court is to adhere to the Constitution, and overturn the erroneous precedents, not to adhere to error in the name of stability. The Warren
Court recognized as much when it began to enforce the long-neglected

62. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574. Similarly, would-be Justice Bork, who has proposed reversing
much of the Court's jurisprudence of the last half-century, stated in his confirmation hearings
that he would not question existing Court doctrine on the interstate commerce power.
63. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

64. la at 79 (finding federal courts must apply state law, not federal common law).
65. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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criminal procedure provisions of the Constitution.66
Undoing sixty years of wrongly decided cases (and a few from
prior years) regarding the interstate commerce power is just as legitimate as the Court's earlier undoing of many decades' worth of wrongly
decided equal protection cases. It is true that there has been substantial
reliance, especially by the Congress, on the mistaken Commerce Clause
cases. But the Court has already stated that "no one acquires a67 vested
or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use.,
The federal government's over-involvement in non-federal affairs is
far less solidified than was the encrustation of Jim Crow which had
been permitted by the erroneous Fourteenth Amendment cases.68 Many
thousands of school buildings and other facilities had been built, in
reliance on long-established Supreme Court precedent, with separate
"white" and "colored" sections. Segregation at school and in many
other areas was deeply ingrained in the South, and many other parts of
the United States. When the Court, in Brown v. Board of Education,69
destabilized its equal protection jurisprudence, the consequences were
immense. A furious white backlash drove Southern white moderates
out of politics; fanning the hottest levels of white anger became the
surest path to political success in the South.7" Affection for racial
segregation (having been sanctioned by, among other things, decades of
federal judicial tolerance for it) was deeply embedded in the characters
of tens of millions of Americans. For years and years after Brown,
state and local governments proudly announced their intention to use
every possible means to defy the Court's decision. Within a few years
of Brown, presidents were finding it necessary to federalize the National Guard, and even call out regular Army troops, in order to enforce
the Court's decision against the wishes of large, violent, angry mobs.7'

66. Philip Kurland observes that "[t]he list of opinions destroyed by the Warren Court reads
like a table of contents from an old constitutional law casebook." PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 90-91 (1970).
67. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). "IS]quatter sovereignty certainly does
not run against the sovereign people," observes Raoul Berger. "[R]cpetition does not legitimate
usurpation." Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEx. L. REV.
695, 715 (1996).
68. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
70. See Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81
J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994).

71. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 3497, 27 Fed. Reg. 9681 (1962); Exec. Order No. 11,053,
27 Fed. Reg. 9693 (1962) (authorizing use of military to enforce school desegregation in Mis-
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For all the dislocation, even a decade after Brown, three quarters of
It took decades of effort for
Southern districts were still segregated.'
the entire federal court system finally to enforce Brown and its progeny; federal judges faced death threats, and other citizens died in the
effort to make Brown the real law of the land. Yet today, even the
minority of Constitutional scholars who believe that Brown was wrongly decided do not argue that the Court's mistake was in destabilizing
existing precedent.
Contrast the dislocation in Brown with a hypothetical Supreme
Court decision which made Justice Thomas's concurrence the law; the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States" would
be interpreted to cover only what the Constitution literally says: the
power to regulate commerce (buying and selling things) across state
lines. If such a decision were implemented all at once, like Chadha or
Erie, hundreds of federal laws would fall. Undoubtedly a significant
political movement would arise to amend the Constitution, to give Congress the enumerated power to enact some or all of the laws that had
been stricken.
But there would be no angry mobs to be put down by federal
troops. The fabric of life would not change all that much for most
people. While many whites had an intense emotional and intellectual
stake in racism, it is doubtful that today's federal government sprawl
inspires such devotion. Restrictions on congressional power over interstate commerce would not produce the fear and hatred that accompanied compulsory integration. Angry citizens would not festoon their
cars with "Impeach William Rehnquist" bumper stickers.' As Steven
Calabresi observes, Lopez has produced "much gnashing of teeth among
law professors but barely a ripple of protest among the public at
large."7 4
In the long run, as Raoul Berger observes, stability would be enhanced by the Court returning Commerce Clause interpretation to the
text of the Constitution. Since the text does not change (except
through amendment), Commerce Clause jurisprudence would become

sissippi).
72. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 441 (1980).
73. "Impeach Earl Warren" bumper stickers were popular in the 1960s, and several impeachment resolutions were actually introduced. See ED CRAY, CHIEF J. 'sii: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL
WARREN (1997).
74. Steven G. Calabresi, A Government of Limlted and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L REv. 752, 827 (1995).
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much more predictable.75 If the topic of the legislation does not involve buying and selling something across state lines, then the commerce power is not involved.
At any rate, to whatever extent previously-enacted over-reaching
statutes may be protected by some version of Constitutional adverse
possession, no legislation enacted after Lopez can claim a reliance interest on the theory that the commerce power is unbounded. If Congress
enacts legislation with as potentially weak an interstate commerce predicate as the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, Congress cannot claim it
was surprised if the Act is declared void under Lopez.
C. The Thomas Concurrence
Although Justice Thomas joined the majority, he also wrote a concurring opinion which, in effect, announced that the emperor was unclad. While the majority opinion stated that Commerce Clause-based
statutes must deal with subjects that "substantially affect" interstate
commerce, rather than merely "affect" it, Justice Thomas suggested that
the whole "effects" debate was off the point. The power to regulate
"Commerce . . .among the several States" means exactly what it says:
the power to regulate the interstate buying and selling of goods.
"Commerce" means buying and selling things-not manufacturing, and
not simply "any form of economic activity."76 The Constitution did not
grant Congress power to regulate activities which merely affect (even in
a substantial way) interstate commerce. After all, there is no "effects"
prong to the post office power; Congress cannot use the postal power
to regulate activities (such as faxes, which reduce the demand for mail)
just because the activity "affects" the post office. 77 Further, if the

75. See Berger, supra note 67, at 700.

As Justice Scalia wrote for a six-member majority

in another separation of powers decision, categorically invalidating all legislated invalidation of
judicial judgment:
[Tihe doctrine of separation of powers is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy

to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified.
In its major features (of which the conclusiveness of judicial judgments is assuredly
one) it is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions because
low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict . .

.

. Separation of powers, a distinctively American political doc-

trine, profits from the advice authored by a distinctively American poet: Good fences
make good neighbors.
Plaut v. Spendthrift, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239-40 (1995).
76. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J.,concurring).

77. See id. at 588.
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interstate commerce power included power over actions or things which

"substantially affect" interstate commerce, then other enumerated congressional powers, such as the power to establish uniform rules of
bankruptcy, are superfluous."
When the founders wanted to add an

"effect" penumbra to a Constitutional provision, they knew how to do
so, as when they prohibited amendments that "shall in any manner
affect" certain slavery provisions in Article I."

As a matter of textual interpretation and original intent, Justice

Thomas is clearly correct, as Raoul Berger explicates.80 Had the state
ratifying conventions foreseen how the interstate commerce power
would be expanded far beyond actual interstate commerce, the proposed

Constitution, which was ratified by very narrow margins in several
states, would almost certainly have been rejected. Even the Constitution's most ardent defenders and the greatest advocates of national
power, such as Hamilton and Madison, repeatedly emphasized the nar-

row scope of the interstate commerce power, and stressed that state
control of almost all policy issues would remain undisturbed."'
78. See id.at 589.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. V, cl.1; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J.,concurring).
80. See Berger, supra note 67.
81. See id.;
see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 583 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (summarizing Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause In the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MwNN. L REv. 432 (1941): "The Framers
perceived the interstate commerce power to be important but limited, and expected that it
would be used primarily if not exclusively to remove interstate tariffs and to regulate maritime
affairs and large-scale mercantile enterprise.").
As to the intended narrow scope of federal criminal authority, see generally TitOMAS JEFFERSON, THE KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA REsOUno\s (1798):
That the Constitution of the United States having delegated to Congress a power to
punish treason, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States,
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the laws of
the nation, and no other crimes whatever, and it being true as general principle, and
one of the amendments to the Constitution also having so declared, "that the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the People"; therefore, also the
same act of Congress, passed on the 14th day of July, 1798, and entitled "An act in
addition to the act entitled 'an act for the punishment of certain crimes against the
United States,' as also an act passed by them on the 27th day of June, 1798, entitled, 'An act to punish frauds committed on the Bank of the United States,'" (and
all other their acts which assume to create, define, or punish crimes other than those
enumerated in the Constitution,) are altogether void and of no force, and that the
power to create, define, and punish such other crimes is reserved, and of right appertains solely and exclusively, to the respective States, each within its own territory.
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions are valid sources for late 20th-centuzy constitutional
interpretation, including for issues of federalism and the validity of federal criminal laws. See.
e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
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If Justice Thomas's opinion were the position of the Court, the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act case would not even rise to the level of
an easy case. It would border on the frivolous for an attorney to assert
that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was a regulation of the interstate buying and selling of goods.
At the present, we do not know the long-term fate of the Thomas
concurrence. It may wind up, like Justice Jackson's concurrence in the
Steel Seizure Case,82 as one of those historic concurrences that become
the true holding of the case. Or it may wind up, like most concurring
opinions, as mere fodder for discussion notes in law school casebooks.
II.

LOWER FEDERAL COURTS

Although it has not been very long, as the legal system goes, since
Lopez was decided, there has been time for some lower courts to apply
Lopez here and there. We do not discuss the post-Lopez cases to prove
that a particular result is inevitable when the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act is challenged (as the Act certainly will be, if it becomes law).
Rather, the cases illustrate the types of reasoning being used by courts
in analyzing Lopez issues. In sum, the cases offer a court analyzing
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act enough running-room to decide the
issue either way. Of course, lower courts can be wrong: Lopez resolved a split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in favor of the
Fifth. 3 In this survey, we move from areas for which congressional
power has been most strongly sustained, to areas for which it has been
most strongly questioned.
A. "Bad" Objects: Firearmsand Drugs
The two fields of criminal law for which Congress has interjected
itself at the most minute levels are firearms and drugs. Most of the
firearms laws enacted under the interstate commerce power date back to
the Gun Control Act ("GCA") of 1968, while the drug laws come
mostly from the Nixon administration's Comprehensive Drug Abuse

EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 271 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 342 n.41 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274, 275 n.15 (1964); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 774 n.6 (1950).
82. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
83. See United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991).

1997]

LOPEZ AND THE PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT

Prevention and Control Act. 4 Since Lopez, lower courts have almost
always upheld these laws, illustrating, perhaps, that Justice Kennedy's
concern about the stability of prior jurisprudence upholding federal
interstate commerce power is widely shared among the lower federal
courts.

1. Guns
Careful construction can be-and has been-used to avoid potential
Lopez problems in the firearms context. For example, the statute imposing a sentence enhancement for use of a firearm in a robbery was
read so as to require commission of a federally prosecutable crime,
with its own distinct Commerce Clause predicate. Thus, when a defendant violated the federal law against robbing a financial institution, the
court readily applied the sentence enhancement for use of a firearm."
Since the 1930s, all gun dealers in the United States have been
required to obtain a federal firearms license ("FFL'). Thus, a statute
criminalizing the theft from a Federal Firearms Licensee of a firearm
that has been shipped in interstate commerce presented no Lopez problem. 6 (We should note that the stolen gun's movement in interstate
commerce would not be a remote event; the FFL would likely have
received the gun from an out-of-state wholesaler, or the wholesaler
would have received the gun from an out-of-state manufacturer.)
The much more important line of cases, however, simply involved
statutes under which a convicted felon (who is prohibited by federal
law from possessing a firearm) was prosecuted for possessing a firearm.
Without exception, the courts have found a simple line-crossing basis
was sufficient; as long as the firearm was shown, at some point, to
have been transferred across state boundaries, the exercise of power
under the Commerce Clause was legitimate. Courts handling such
cases have zeroed in on the Lopez majority's observation that the GunFree School Zones Act did not have a jurisdictional predicate. 7

84. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Fryer, 896 F. Supp 763, 764 (N.D. !II. 1995).

86. See United States v. Snow, 82 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 1996).
87. See United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 1101, 1104 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding ban on posses-

sion of firearm with obliterated serial number is lawful, because of specific jurisdictional requirement that firearm itself must have been shipped in interstate or foreign commerce). For
simple unlawful possession cases, see United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 1996);

United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d
294 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991 (8th Cir.
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In the context of firearms cases, some courts have strained particularly hard to find an interstate commerce nexus. For example, the
Eighth Circuit upheld a conviction for possession of ammunition-which had been manufactured in the defendant's home state-on
the grounds that components of the ammunition had been imported by
the manufacturing company. s8
Two pre-Lopez Supreme Court precedents are repeatedly cited by
the lower courts in upholding the federal bans on simple gun possession by persons with criminal convictions. In United States v. Bass,s9
the Court's major case interpreting the then-new GCA, the Court was
faced with a congressional statute which made it illegal for a felon to
receive, transport, or possess any firearms "in commerce or affecting
commerce." The prosecution had shown that Bass was a felon and that
he possessed a firearm, but no other interstate commerce nexus had
been demonstrated. Although the Bass Court could, theoretically, have
upheld Bass's conviction on the theory that gun crime substantially
affects the interstate economy, and banning gun possession by ex-felons
is a rational way for Congress to reduce such harm to the interstate
economy, the Court did not do so. Instead, the Court reversed Bass's
conviction. The Bass majority reasoned that the statute was ambiguous;
if the statute were interpreted as a ban on simple possession, the 1968
GCA would "have significantly changed the federal state balance."9
After discussing Bass in a long paragraph, the Lopez Court explained
that Bass's interpreting the statute to require a specific interstate commerce nexus to possession was proper, since a contrary interpretation
would "require[] decision of serious constitutional questions."'"
After Bass, prosecutors enforcing the 1968 GCA made sure to
prove that the particular gun the felon had possessed had been trans92
ported across state lines. Years later, in Scarborough v United States,
the Court held that Congress had only intended to require a minimal
nexus with interstate commerce. As long as the gun had crossed state
lines, even if the crossing were years before the felon's conviction, and

1995); United States v. Edwards, 894 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Wis. 1995); United States v. Brown,
893 F. Supp. 11 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
88. See United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995).
89. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
90. Bass, 404 U.S. at 349. Cf United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1540 (S.D. Cal.

1996) (citing Bass as reason to narrowly construe application of ambiguous federal bribery statute to state officials).
91. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
92. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
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even if the felon had nothing to do with the interstate crossing, the
GCA of 1968 still applied. In contrast to Bass, Scarborough was not
cited or discussed by the Lopez Court, and appropriately so;
Scarborough was purely a statutory construction case, and the defendant
apparently never raised the issue of whether the government's interpretation of the GCA of 1968 would mean that the GCA exceeded congressional powers over interstate commerce.
Thus, technically speaking, lower courts are free to examine the
outer boundaries of the GCA to determine if they are consistent with
Lopez. But for courts disinclined to challenge the charging decisions of
United States Attorneys in gun prosecutions, Scarborough offers a citation which, for the lower court's purpose, can be used to sidestep the
issue. Yet as currently interpreted, the federal gun possession laws
raise precisely the kind of "areas of traditional state concern" issues
which were raised in the Kennedy/O'Connor concurrence in Lopez.
Control of gun possession has traditionally been a state issue. The federal ban applies to all felony convictions (including non-violent convictions in the distant past), and all guns. 93 In contrast, many state
laws against possession of guns by ex-criminals apply only to violent
felonies, or apply only for a period of years following the conviction,
or apply only to handguns. If Colorado decides to allow a person who
was convicted of income tax evasion thirty-five years ago to possess a
.22 rifle for squirrel hunting, why should the federal government override that decision?94

93. In 1996, the ban was expanded to domestic violence misdemeanors. See 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8) (1997). As with felonies, the ban applied to persons whose convictions had occurred
many years before the ban became law.
94. Cf Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n3 (criticizing Gun-Free School Zones Act based on government's admission that the Act "displacels] state policy choices in .. .that its prohibitions
apply even in states that have not chosen to outlaw the conduct in question"); Carlo D'Angelo,
Note, The Impact of United States v. Lopez Upon Selected Firearms Provisions of Title 18
U.S.C. § 922, 8 ST. THOmAS L. REv. 571 (1996) (suggesting that under Lopez, the following
statutes are unconstitutional: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon), 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (carrying or using a firearm with intent to commit a violent or drug crime),
18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number), 18 U.S.C. §
922(o) (possession of machine guns)).
In an Indiana case, a man named David Eubank who had served a prison sentence for
robbery was released, and put on probation. He went straight, and checked in regularly with
his parole officer. He asked the officer if it was alright to get a .22 rifle for hunting, and the
probation officer said yes. The probation officer was correct under Indiana law, which allows
ex-felons to own long guns, but was incorrect under federal law, which does not distinguish
long guns from handguns.
A while later, Indiana police and federal officials raided Eubank's home, searching for
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Even more constitutionally problematic is the 1986 federal law

banning possession of new machine guns by anyone.95 In contrast to
the felon-in-possession laws, the machine gun ban contains no jurisdictional predicate. Nor were there any legislative findings-or even hearings-regarding an effect on interstate commerce. Instead, the ban was

attached as a hastily-drafted floor amendment to another firearms bill in
the House of Representatives. 6 The entire legislative history consists
of the sponsor of the ban, former Representative Bill Hughes (D-N.J.),
saying that he cannot understand why anyone would want to own a

machine gun. The federal ban on the possession of machine guns
manufactured after May 19, 1986 has been upheld on the basis of congressional findings about interstate commerce in earlier laws regulating
machine gun purchases. 97 Or, it has been argued, possession of a machine gun must necessarily involve a transfer, and a transfer is com-

merce, and banning possession is how Congress can best ban interstate
transfers.9"
evidence that he was committing robberies again. They found no such evidence, but they did
find a .22 rifle. Eubank was then prosecuted for possession of the rifle. Ironically, he faced
a longer term for possessing the gun (a 15 year mandatory minimum)-after his probation
officer told him it was alright-than he would have served if he actually perpetrated more
robberies. Eubank went to trial, and, apparently in an act of jury nullification, was acquitted.
He had already served several months in jail, while he was held awaiting trial.
An El Paso case had a different result. Bill Keagle, who had committed burglaries in
1978, went straight after release from prison, and, unaware of the federal act, took the .22 rifle
and a shotgun he owned down to a pawnshop and sold them. As part of the sale, he filled
our the federal gun registration document, Form 4473. Since Keagle had sold the guns, and
had been willing to fill out a registration form when he did so, he obviously was not planning
to use the guns in a crime.
But after the El Paso police inspected the pawnshop and found the 4473 form, the federal
prosecutor joined the case. In exchange for dropping charges which would have led to the 15
year mandatory minimum, Keagle was forced to accept an eight year prison sentence. See
Dennis Cauchon, Trapped by the Law, USA TODAY, July 6, 1992, at 3A.
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994).
96. The amendment did not even receive a recorded vote. Rep. Mario Biaggi (later forced
to leave the House as a result of a felony conviction) was presiding over the House that day;
he declared that the proponents of the amendment had prevailed in a voice vote-even though
the voices appeared to be evenly divided-and violated the rules of the House by ignoring
requests for a recorded vote.
97. See United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995). See also United States v.
Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 890-91 (7th Cir. 1996).
98. See United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1996). This plainly goes too
far. The Mann Act prohibits the movement of a person in interstate commerce for purposes of
prostitution. See 36 Stat. 825, ch. 395 (1910), upheld in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308
(1913). It is not suggested that congressional power to ban the movement of a prostitute from
Los Angeles to Seattle can be enforced by a ban on purely intra-state prostitution, including In
areas where prostitution is legal, such as certain counties in Nevada. Cf Mortensen v. United
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After the ban was stricken by a district court in Mississippi," the
Fifth Circuit upheld the ban by a 2-1 vote. In dissent, Judge Edith
Jones suggested that Congress lacks the power to prohibit possession of
a machine gun under the commerce power. Rejecting the majority's
theory that a ban on possession is a permissible exercise of the power
to ban interstate commerce in an item, Judge Jones argued:
The statute is not limited to possession in or even affecting
interstate commerce, or to possession of a firearm that has
traveled in interstate commerce. Rather, it criminalizes the
mere private possession of a machine gun. The majority infer
from the fact that Section 922(o) prohibits "transfer" as well as
"possession" that channels or things in commerce were intended
to be regulated. This inference seems unwarranted for two reasons. First, transfer as well as possession of a thing can be of
a wholly intrastate character. Second, when the government
criminalizes conduct in the disjunctive, it may prosecute separately each type of conduct disjunctively named. Thus, as in
this case, possession alone is criminalized independent of any
transfer of a machine gun.'
Judge Jones concluded her analysis by pointing out that:
Lopez reminds us forcefully that Congress's enumerated power
over commerce must have some limits in order to maintain our
federal system of government and preserve the states' traditional
exercise of the police power. Section 922(o) is a purely criminal law, without any nexus to commercial activity, and its enforcement would intrude the federal police power into every
village and remote enclave of this vast and diverse nation.'0 '
Since the Jones dissent, the federal machine gun ban has suffered
some close calls. The Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc, and split
eight-to-eight, thereby leaving the original decision intact."
In the

States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944) (holding Mann Act inapplicable to defendants v'ho took Nebraska
prostitutes on a non-sexuai vacation trip to Utah).
99. See United States v. Bownds, 860 F. Supp. 336 (S.D. Miss. 1994). See also United
States v. Gambill, 912 F. Supp. 287, 290 (S.D. Ohio 1996) ('mere possession of a machine
gun may not implicate interstate commerce").
100. United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 1996) (Jones, J, dissenting).
101. Id. at 802. Although some states have outlawed machine gun possession, most have
not, and thus the federal law overrides policy decisions of many states.
102. See United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997). Eight judges voted to affinm
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Third and Sixth Circuits, the ban again was upheld, but by two-to-one
split decisions. 3 Issues similar to the machine gun ban are raised by
the new federal ban on so-called "assault weapons" and magazines

per curiam. Three of them joined a lengthy opinion by Judge Higginbotham which (like Justice Breyer's dissent in Lopez) stitched together excerpts from various popular magazine articles
which allegedly showed that machine guns were sometimes used in crime; repeatedly asserted
how dangerous machine guns are; said that machine guns have no social utility, and claimed
that while Congress would not ban mere possession of ordinary guns, machine guns were on a
different plane, and could be banned. See id. The dissenters, led by Judge Jones, replied that
the ban on possession could not be justified as carrying out a ban on commercial transfer
(since one could acquire a machine gun through a non-commercial transfer, such as a bequest;
or a malfunctioning semi-automatic might fire two bullets with a single trigger press, and thereby be classified as a machine gun by federal law). See id.
Regarding the post-hoc efforts of various courts to conclude that Congress-while remaining utterly silent on the subject-had somehow determined that machine guns burden interstate
commerce:
The suggestion that Congress secretly made such a finding is just as speculative as it
would be to suggest that Congress secretly thought such firearms to be a burden on
raising armies, collecting taxes, coining money, establishing post offices, punishing
piracies on the high seas, or other subjects of Congress's enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAw DESKBOOK 5-5 (1997).
Later, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit heard a different machine gun case, and
upheld the statute, thereby resolving the issue that had been left unresolved by the en bane
panel's even division. See United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1997).
103. See United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 46
(1997). The majority argued that although section 922(o) had no legislative history or findings
about interstate commerce, the legislative history of other portions of the Gun Control
Act-which had been enacted in different years and which said nothing about machine
guns-supplied sufficient findings about interstate commerce. See id. at 279-80. The dissent
pointed out that not all cases of possession in violation of 922(o) involve an illegal transfer
(the owner could have converted a semiautomatic to automatic, for example), nor is every illegal transfer an interstate transfer. See id. at 288. Further, the possession of a machine gun
on one's property has no more genuine connection with interstate commerce or commerce of
any sort than does possession of a gun within a school zone. See id. at 291. Neither Congress nor the government attorneys defending 922(o) have produced any evidence that the occasional intrastate possession of machine guns by interstate criminals (e.g. controlled substance
merchants, racketeers) has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Id. at 292.
See also United States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding 922(o) because
of alleged "substantial" effect on interstate commerce of machine gun possession); United States
v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996) (ban on possession is proper as regulation of the
"channels" of interstate commerce; ban also proper because machine guns are "things in Interstate commerce"); United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S.
CL 791 (1996) (channels theory); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995) (machine guns are "bound up with interstate attributes"). The Rybar dissent pointed out the weakness of the arguments from the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits: there is no evidence that
Congress passed the machine gun ban in order to protect interstate commerce. And the ban on
simple intrastate possession cannot plausibly be claimed as regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. See Rybar, 103 F.3d at 289-90 (Alto, J., dissenting).
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holding more than ten rounds,"° and on possession of handguns by
juveniles; the latter statute so far has been upheld by one appellate
court."0
In a legal world ruled purely by logic, invalidating the machine gun ban would be a straightforward application of Lopez. (Indeed, it was not all that long ago that federal officials acknowledged
that legislation similar to 922(o) would be unconstitutional.)e' But not
all federal judges are inclined to apply Lopez as written, nor is the
Supreme Court necessarily willing to expend its finite political capital
on a topic as politically incorrect as machine guns.
Although lower courts have not yet mustered the votes to find any
federal gun laws unconstitutional, Justice Thomas recently suggested
that perhaps they should. In Printz v. United States,0 7 the Court's
majority held that Congress did have the power to order state and local

104. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(v) & (w) (1994). For an argument that the law cannot survive a
meaningful application of the rational basis test, see David B. Kopel. Rational Basis Analy s of
"Assault Weapon" Prohibition, 20 J. CoTrmP. L 381 (1994).
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(x) (1994), upheld In United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340,
344 (9th Cir. 1996) (mere possession of a handgun by a juvenile "could have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce").
The juvenile handgun ban is a perfect example of the foolishness of writing law in Washington for application to a diverse nation. The law allows juveniles to possess handguns while
ranching or fanning, or engaged in lawful target shooting or hunting. But even then, the juvenile must have prior written permission from her parents, and must carry that permission at all
times with her while in possession of the handgun.
Only in Washington, D.C., could a sane person believe that teenagers helping on their
parents' ranches and farms in Montana are actually complying with this silly statute. On the
ranch, they do not carry around prior written permission. Off the ranch, they may carry a
handgun in their pickup truck for protection while driving on isolated rural roads at night, as
people in their family have for many generations. It is doubtful that most farmers and ranchers even know of the federal statute.
Apparently determined to prove that there is no foolish action which Congress can undertake that cannot be topped by a future Congress, Senators Diane Feinstein and Orrin Hatch
have proposed a mandatory one-year federal prison sentence for violation of the federal ban.
See S. 54, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997).
106. During the debate over the legislation that eventually became the Gun Control Act of
1968, there was a proposal to ban the possession of any National Fuearms Act firearm (machine gun, short shotgun, short rifle) by any person under the age of twenty-one. Although
the Johnson administration was pushing hard for federal gun control, Fred B. Smith, the General Counsel of the Treasury Department, told Congress:
It seems doubtful that the . . . provision can be justified under the taxing or commerce powers, or under any other power enumerated in the Constitution for Federal
enactment Consequently, the Department questions the advisability of including in
the bill a measure which could be construed as a usurpation of the [police] power
reserved to the states by Article X of the United States Constitutional Amendments.
Federal Firearms Act: Hearings before the Subcomm to im'estlgate Juvenile Delinquency, Judiciary Comm, 90th Cong. 1088, 1089 (1967), quoted in HALBROOK, supra note 102, at 5-3 n.5.
107. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
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law enforcement officials to perform background checks on retail handgun buyers. Concurring, Justice Thomas briefly addressed an issue
which had not been raised by the plaintiffs, who were sheriffs (rather
than prospective gun buyers): whether the Brady Act's regulation of
retail gun sales"' was constitutional. Justice Thomas suggested it was
not: "the Federal Government's authority under the Commerce Clause,
which merely allocates to Congress the power 'to regulate Commerce .
• .among the several states,' does not extend to the regulation of wholly intrastate, point of sale transactions."'0 9
2. Drugs
Federal drug laws go even further than most of the federal gun
laws, since there is no requirement that the drugs in question have ever
been transferred in interstate commerce. Federal law also criminalizes
simple possession, and requires no nexus of the drugs with interstate
commerce. Here, the courts have relied on extensive congressional
findings of a national market in illegal drugs which substantially affects
interstate commerce, and which can only be controlled by federal law
reaching all the way to simple possession of a single marijuana plant
grown for personal consumption."'
Given that drugs per se are considered within the commerce power,
courts have found no problem with sentence enhancements for activity
which is, by itself, unrelated to the commerce power. For example, a
sentence enhancement for possession of a firearm (regardless of whether
the firearm ever moved in interstate commerce) while trafficking in
drugs is legitimate, since the drugs themselves supply all the interstate

108. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) & (t) (1994).
109. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (Thomas, J.,concurring). Justice Thomas also suggested that
the Brady Act, even if within the commerce power, might violate the Second Amendment. See
id. He observed that while the Court has said little about the Second Amendment in the last

sixty decades, there has been a great deal of scholarly discussion of the issue, almost all of
which finds the Second Amendment to guarantee an individual right.

110. See United States v. Dortch, 98 F.3d 1364, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See also United
States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 147475 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995); GuzmanRivera v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 138, 141 (D.P.R. 1996); United States v. Walker, 910 F.
Supp. 837 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Kremetis, 903 F. Supp. 250 (D.N.H. 1995); Unit-

ed States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1995) (sale of drugs in school zone); United
States v. Gonzalez, 893 F. Supp. 935 (S.D. Cal. 1995).

Although the 1988 law banning sim-

ple possession- of crack cocaine had no jurisdictional predicate, and no congressional findings,
the 1970 findings about the interstate commerce impact of drugs in general was allowed to
carry forward for the crack ban.
(D. Kan. 1996).

See United States v. Watson, 942 F. Supp. 1378, 1383-86
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commerce nexus that is necessary."' Likewise, a sentence enhancement
for sale of drugs in a "school zone" is lawful, since drugs substantially
affect commerce, whether or not they are in a school zone."
While the federal gun and drug statutes go immensely beyond the
powers that People of the United States thought they were granting the
Congress in Article I, and while many of these cases are tortuously
reasoned, we need not dissect the cases further in the context of this
article. In each of the gun and drug cases, either the object itself
moved in interstate commerce (the gun), or the object is often sold
interstate (drugs), and Congress has made explicit, detailed findings
about the interstate commerce effect of local commerce in the object.
In contrast, regarding partial-birth abortions, the equipment used to
perform the abortion is not being regulated. What is being banned is
an action, not the possession or transfer of a valuable.
B. Other Criminal Statutes
Unlike the challenges to the gun and drug laws (both involving objects which, we suspect, many federal judges loathe),' Lopez challenges to other federal laws have often resulted in the law's being declared
unconstitutional, or have at least yielded a vigorous dissent suggesting
that the law should have been stricken.
1. Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act is a 1945 statute setting penalties for "[w]hoever in
any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by robbery or extortion
... Although the underlying motive of the sponsors was apparently labor racketeering, the statute was written in broad terms so as to
deflect charges (which were made anyway) that the Act was an antilabor bill, which it was." 5
The post-Lopez Hobbs Act cases split. The Eleventh Circuit held
that even though a city council used an out-of-state contractor and
bought goods from interstate commerce, there was no evidence that the

111. See United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 96 (8th Cir. 1995).
112. See United States v. Medina, 901 F. Supp. 59 (D.P.R. 1995).

113. See generally Brannon Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 Ctmi.

L REV. 961

(1996).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978) (discussing legislative history).
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attempt to blackmail one city council member into resigning "would
have impacted the continuing business of th[e] governing body in such
a manner as to constitute a violation of the federal statute."' 6 The
court argued that even the pre-Lopez Hobbs Act cases suggested that
there was no interstate commerce
jurisdiction, and there was certainly
7
post-Lopez."
no jurisdiction
But according to the Tenth Circuit, robbery and extortion are activities that through repetition can substantially affect interstate commerce. Therefore the interstate commerce power could properly be
exercised to prosecute a defendant who robbed two restaurants, one bar,
a scrap metal business, and an individual, all in the state of Kansas."'
The difference between the two circuits (other than the Tenth
Circuit's failure so far to find any federal statute in conflict with
Lopez) is whether to employ Wickard-style aggregation: can the defendant's criminal act, which does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, be aggregated with all similar criminal acts, and the
interstate commerce power applied because in the aggregate there is a
substantial effect? According to Lopez, aggregation is only permissible
when the acts in question are themselves commercial." 9
This aggregation issue is directly relevant to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. Should a court look at the lowest level of generality
(how to perform an abortion) or the highest (the abortion business as a
whole)?
2.

Transportationand Carjacking

In 1995, Congress preempted state regulation of intrastate trucking.
The preemption was upheld as a legitimate exercise of the interstate
commerce power, based on express congressional findings that state

116. United States v. Frost, 77 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 1996). While some pre-Lopez
cases had construed the Hobbs Act narrowly, the greater line of cases pushed the language to
its furthest extremes.

117. See id.See also United States v. Yokley, 542 F.2d 300, 304 (6th Cir. 1976) (applying
Hobbs Act to armed robbery of a single victim would be "an unprecedented incursion into the

criminal jurisdiction of the States").
118. See United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 398 (10th Cir. 1995). See also United States
v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (majority holds that restaurant robbery violates
Hobbs Act, since restaurant would have used some of the stolen money to buy goods from
interstate commerce); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Pettiford, 934 F. Supp. 479, 481-82 (D. Mass. 1996) (under "depletion of assets"
theory, robbery victim had less money to spend on goods in interstate commerce; therefore,
Hobbs Act jurisdiction existed).
119. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
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regulation has "imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce," as well as extensive additional findings about the substantial
20
effects of intrastate regulation on interstate commerce.1
While the trucking industry is readily seen as one of the channels
of interstate commerce, the status of automobiles has not been so clear.
2
The post-Lopez appellate case that is best suited for classroom study1 '
is United States v. Bishop,"2 a Third Circuit case in which two of the
three judges voted to uphold the federal carjacking statute. The majority reasoned that the statute relates to road safety and the interstate
and foreign markets for stolen car parts. Likewise, car theft affects
insurance prices."n
Not only does cajacking "substantially affect"
interstate commerce, cars themselves are "instrumentalities" of interstate
commerce. 24 The majority pointed to extensive congressional findings
about the interstate problem of car theft, and noted with approval that
the statute requires that the car must have been "transported, shipped,
or received" through interstate commerce (although the crime itself
need have no particular relation to interstate commerce, such as taking
the carjacked vehicle across state lines)."s
Judge Edward Becker's dissent countered as follows: auto theft in
general may be an economic activity, but carjacking is a crime of violence. When enacting the carjacking statute, Congress was not concerned with the interstate market in stolen car parts, but instead with
the violence of the carjacking itself. The anecdotal evidence from
newspapers, cited in the majority opinion, was insufficient to prove a
substantial effect on interstate commerce; courts must see whether "adequate data, available by way of Congressional findings or otherwise,
establish that the proscribed non-commercial activity has a sufficient

120. Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1507-08 (10th Cir. 1995).

See also Harris

County Wrecker Owners for Equal Opportunity v. Houston, 943 F. Supp. 711, 733 (S.D. Tex.
1996).

Cf CSX Transp. v. Georgia Pub. Sere. Comm., 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1585-86 (N.D.

Geo. 1996) (similar analysis of federal preemption of state regulation of intrastate railroads).
121. An appellate case in which the majority and dissenting opinions are vigorously argued in
detail, and in which the two sides respond to each other's arguments. For another case upholding the carjack statute, see United States v. Hutchinson, 75 F.3d 626 (1 Ith Cir. 1996).
122. 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995).

123. Cf Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 182 (1868) ("Issuing a policy of insurance
is not a transaction of commerce. The policies are simple contracts of indemnity . . . . These
contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the word ....
They are not
commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one state to another and put up for sale."), overruled by United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
124. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 578.81, 588.
125. See id. at 585.
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relationship to interstate commerce."' 2 6
Congress, in fact, made no findings about carjacking's effect on
interstate commerce.'2
Moreover, Congress could not rationally conclude that carjackings are an important part of interstate sale of stolen
auto parts, because carjacking is only two percent of auto thefts.'
As for the assertion that all automobiles are instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, such a claim would allow Congress to enact a
national seatbelt law, or to ban right turns on red. 129 Further applying
what we call, the "non-infinity principle," the dissent argued that the
majority argument proves too much, since it would allow federalization
of nearly all crime. 3
Finally, the dissent argued that the presence of a jurisdictional element in the statute is not sufficient by itself. The statute must still fit
under one of the three elements of commerce power. 3 ' Scarborough
was not to the contrary, since it was a pure statutory interpretation
case, and a Commerce Clause analysis was not raised. 3 2 Again using
the "non-infinity principle," the dissent argued that the majority's suggestion that a mere border-crossing conveys jurisdiction would allow
Congress to require students in private schools to read their homework
assignments, if the books came from out of state.' 33
3. Child Support
In 1994, Congress enacted the federal Child Support Recovery Act
(CSRA),'34 which makes it a federal crime for a person to fail to adhere to a child support order if the delinquent parent and the child live
in different states. Given that all nine Justices in Lopez agreed that
family law was beyond the reach of the interstate commerce power,
126. Id. at 591 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127. See id. at 600.
128. See id. at 603. This latter point suggests that a "substantial effect" must be more than
a non-trivial effect. Two percent is certainly tangible, but, arguably non-substantial. Compare
this with Wickard, where wheat grown for home consumption constituted twenty percent of the
wheat crop.

It seems entirely reasonable to conclude, as both Wickard and the Bishop dissent

imply, that a "substantial effect" must comprise somewhere between three and twenty percent of
a given interstate commerce issue.
129. See id. at 599.

But see Kowalczyk v. United States, 936 F. Supp. 1127, 1144-45

(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (federal law barring alteration of vehicle identification numbers is constitutional, because cars are instrumentalities of interstate commerce).

130. See Bishop, 66 F.3d at 591-92 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131.

See id. at 593-94.

132. See id. at 595.
133. See id. at 596.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
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and that the majority announced that any argument which could allow
assertion of interstate commerce power over "child support" was auto-

matically defective, one would expect the CSRA to run into some problems in court.
The courts that have upheld the CSRA have relied on the CSRA's
requirement that the child live in a different state from the delinquent

parent. 35 One of the courts specifically noted that if Congress had
attempted to apply the CSRA to intrastate delinquencies, the statute
would be unconstitutional, as an intrusion upon the traditional state

issue of family law. 36 Of course this dictum militates against the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, since the Act applies to a purely intrastate

medical procedure and, as noted previously, implicates family law.
One

court

analogized

the CSRA

to a

federal

statute

that

criminalizes fleeing a state to avoid being prosecuted or compelled to
testify. 37 In United States v. Mussari,"' the court attacked this analogy due to the "lack of any requirement in the CSRA for the non-paying parent to flee the jurisdiction," much less leave in order to avoid
enforcement of the support order, and held that the CSRA is unconsti-

tutional. 39 Three other district courts have also found the CSRA to be
unconstitutional in spite of the two-state requirement.'4 ° Three of these
courts argued that, although child support involves money, the mere

collection of delinquent child support payments is not commerce.' 4 '

135. See, e.g., United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct
784 (1997); United States v. Johnson, 940 F. Supp. 911, 913-914 (E.D. Va. 1996); United
States v. Lewis, 936 F. Supp. 1093, 1097-1100 (D.RI..
1996); United States v. Sims, 936 F.
Supp. 817, 819-820 (N.D. Okla. 1996); United States v. Ganaposki, 930 F. Supp. 1076, 1083
(M.D. Pa. 1996); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302, 310-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United
States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028, 1035-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v. Kegel, 916
F. Supp. 1233, 1237-39 (M.D. Fla. 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 392-93
(S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1329-30 (D. Kan. 1995)
affd, 95 F.3d 999 (10th cir. 1996), cer. denied, 117 S. Ct 753 (1997).
136. See Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330.
137. See United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D. Va. 1995) (referring to 18
U.S.C. § 1073), vacated on other grounds, 934 F. Supp. 736 (,V.D. Va. 1996), rev'd, 117
F.3d 137 (4th Cir. 1997).
138. 912 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied,
117 S. CL 1567 (1997).
139. Id at 1252.
140. See United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (ED. Pa. 1995); United States v. Bailey,
902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), cert dznted,
117 S. Ct. 1567 (1997).
141. See Mussari, 912 F. Supp. at 1336; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367; Parker, 911 F.
Supp. at 835 (holding that the failure to pay child support does not "substantially affectl] inter-

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:59

Next, the "non-infinity principle" also came into play. According
to the Mussari court, allowing exercise of the interstate commerce power simply because two people live in different states is wrong, because
"[w]ere this court to find that Congress can pass criminal legislation in
every instance where a citizen exercised his or her constitutional right
to travel to a new state to live, Congress would essentially have unlimited, unchecked authority to legislate as to any area of an individual's
,142
life.
In another application of the non-infinity principle, the Parker court
rejected the government's argument that families that are deprived of
child support will sometimes lack the "basic necessities," go on welfare,
and become a burden to the federal government, because:
Under the "basic necessities" theory, Congress would have power to enact a criminal offense prohibiting any crime that deprives another person of money. Congress, under this scenario,
could punish embezzlers, con artists, and muggers-even if
their activity was solely intrastate-because the proceeds of the
crimes likely would have helped the victim afford food, housing, medical care, or other goods and services. If the court
were to follow this reasoning, it would be converting traditionally state-enforced, common-law crimes of theft into federal
crimes, thus derogating the constitutionally critical "distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local.', 43
Various findings of fact by Congress about the economic effect of child
support non-payment were rejected as not constituting a rational basis
44
for Congress to have found substantial effects on interstate commerce.
Finally, the "traditional areas of state concern" doctrine applied with
special force, since federal courts have long applied a voluntary "domestic relations exception" to avoid hearing diversity cases dealing with
domestic relations. 45 Although granted diversity jurisdiction by Con-

state commerce").
142. Mussari, 912 F. Supp. at 1256.
143. Parker, 911 F. Supp at 838 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68
(1995)).

144. See id. at 836-37.
145. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992).

The domestic relations exception raises issues about the constitutionality of the new federal
ban on possession of a firearm by anyone subject to a domestic relations restraining order, or
by anyone ever convicted (including convictions long before the date of the ban) of a misdemeanor involving domestic violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (1997).
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gress, federal courts refuse to exercise it in domestic relations cases out
of deference to federalism. The Mussari court held that this exception
was applicable to the CSRA, since a federal court
would have to deter46
mine the validity of a state court support order.1
4. Arson and Explosives
As Justice Breyer warned in his Lopez dissent, the Lopez decision
has caused trouble for the federal arson statute, which punishes arson
of buildings that are "used in activity affecting interstate commerce."'4
One case upholding and applying the arson statute pointed to the specific jurisdictional requirement that the building be used in interstate
commerce. 48 In the case at bar, noted the Sixth Circuit, the college
dormitory which had been burned held mostly out-of-state students,
and
49
the college purchased many supplies from out-of-state vendors.
In a decision not inconsistent with the Sixth Circuit's holding, the
Ninth Circuit found that arson of a private residence (even when perpetrated for insurance fraud) "is not commercial or economic in na-

ture.'

50

[W]here Congress seeks to regulate a purely intrastate noncommercial activity that has traditionally been subject to exclusive
regulation by state or local government, and where the connection of the regulated activity as a whole to interstate commerce
is neither readily apparent nor illuminated by express congressional findings, the government must satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement by pointing to a "substantial" effect on or connec-

146. See Mussari, 912 F. Supp. at 1254-55.

See also United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp.

727, 729 (1995) (citing the Mussari court argument with approval).
It might be noted that child support across state boundaries is not an area in which states
are incapable of acting. Many states have enacted the Uniform Interstate Child Support Act, to
give expedited'judicial enforcement to child support orders from other states. See. eg., COLO.
REv. STAT.

§§

14-5-101 to -1007 (Supp. 1996).

147. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
148. See United States v. Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1212-14 (6th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116

S. Ct 795 (1996).
149. See id at 1213.

See also United States v. Corona, 934 F. Supp 740. 74344 (ED. La.

1996) (upholding jury determination that property under renovation for use as rental property or
a youth hostel was "being used in interstate commerce or in an activity %%hich substantially
affected interstate commerce," and that the defendants were guilty under the federal arson statute), modified on another issue, 108 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 1997). Cf Reedy v. United States,
934 F. Supp. 184, 187 (V.D. Va. 1996) (asserting that 18 U.S.C. § 844(1), the federal arson

statute, can be constitutionally applied to all business property).
150. United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1995).
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tion to interstate commerce.' 5'
That the home "received a supply of natural gas from a company that
obtained some of that gas from outside the state," did not create a substantial connection between the arson and interstate commerce. 52 "Unlike a firearm or a car, both of which can readily move in interstate
commerce, a house has a particularly local rather than interstate character."'5 Therefore the court reversed the defendant's 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
conviction for lack of federal jurisdiction.'54
Surprisingly, a decision with very broad implications for restraining
overuse of the interstate commerce power may have emerged in a case
in which the decision did the defendant no good. Timothy McVeigh
and Terry Nichols were charged with, among other things, violating 18
U.S.C. § 2332a by using "a weapon of mass destruction" (a truck
bomb) to injure persons or damage property in the United States. 55 In
a pretrial ruling, Chief Judge Richard Matsch noted that the statute suffered the same infirmity as the statute declared unconstitutional in
Lopez: no jurisdictional predicate, and no congressional findings regarding interstate commerce.' 56 But, Judge Matsch continued, he could only
declare the statute unconstitutional if it were unconstitutional as applied
to the case at bar." 7 Judge Matsch then refused to dismiss the two
counts charging violations of section 2332a, explaining he would instruct the jury that the existence of a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce was an essential element of the offense charged.' 58 Given
that the murder of 168 people and the destruction of a large office
building could easily be said to have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, the jury had no trouble convicting McVeigh of the offense.
It seems doubtful that the judge's instruction will help Nichols at trial.

151. Id.at 527.
152. Id. at 526-27.

153. Id. at 527-28.
In the Eleventh Circuit, prosecution of arson of a private residence was likewise held to

be beyond the scope of the commerce power, even though the residence contained a home
office at which the homeowner worked on matters of international commerce. See United
States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (lth Cir.), modified, 90 F.3d 444 (11th Cir. 1996).

The court

ruled that "the evidence did not prove any impact of' the homeowner's work at home on his
employer's contract with a foreign government, under which the homeowner/employee worked
on projects. Id. at 330-31.
154. See Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 527-28.
155. United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1571, 1575 (D. Colo. 1996).

156. See id. at 1576.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 1578.
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But the McVeigh instructions create a very significant precedent in
other cases. For a defendant charged with mere possession of a gun,
or with perpetrating one robbery of a small store, many juries might
find that the defendant's isolated crime did not have a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce.
5. Abortion and Other Medical Services
Another new federal criminal statute is the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE").'3 9 The Seventh Circuit's United States
v. Wilson split decision upholding FACE (after the district court had
declared it unconstitutional) is an excellent example of the kinds of
arguments that can be employed on each side of post-Lopez cases.'"t
The majority was persuaded by congressional findings that the presence of blockades forces patients to travel to other states, and interferes
with "the interstate commercial activities of health care providers, including the purchase and lease of facilities and equipment . . employment of personnel and . . . purchase of . . . supplies from other
states."' 6' Significantly, abortion patients are a type of consumer quite
likely to travel interstate. For example, at a Virginia clinic, between
twenty and thirty percent of the patients were from other states, and at
one Maryland clinic, over half the patients were from out of state. 162
The majority argued, in effect, that FACE passed the non-infinity test,
because abortion clinics were an especially interstate form of business,
and thus interference with access to clinics had a "substantial effect" on
interstate commerce that would not be present in cases of interference
with access to other facilities that were far less connected to interstate
commerce, such as bowling alleys or campgrounds.' 63

159. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
160. See United States v. Wilson, 73 F3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S.CL 47
(1996). See generallv Amy H. Nemko, Note, Saving FACE: Clinic Access under a New Commerce Clause, 106 YALE LJ. 525 (1996) (reviewing the 7th Circuit's Wilson decision). For
post-Lopez FACE cases adopting reasoning similar to the Wilson majority, see also Cheffer v.
Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519-21 (11th Cir. 1995). Cf United States v. White, 893 F. Supp.
1423, 1425-28, 1432-34 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
161. Wilson, 73 F3d at 680-81 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-306, at 6, 7 (1993), reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 724).
162. See Wilson, 73 F3d at 681 (citing Bray v. Alexandria's Women's Health Clinic, 506
U.S. 263, 312 (1993) (Stevens, J.,dissenting)).
163. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 681-84. See also Tery v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1418 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (noting that while the Gun-Free School Zones Act was based on a lengthy causal
chain-gun possession near schools leads to gun crime which harms education which affects

interstate commerce-the FACE law had only one causal step: obstructive activity outside clinics affects interstate commerce in abortion services).
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Although FACE, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, lacked any
interstate commerce jurisdictional element, the majority did not think
this omission necessarily rendered the statute void.'
The Wilson majority also relied, somewhat improperly, on a postLopez Supreme Court case. Less than a week after Lopez, the Court,
per curiam, decided a racketeering case involving a drug dealer who
laundered his profits by operating a gold mine in Alaska. 6 ' The Court
held that it did not have to decide if the mine's operations met the
requirement of "substantially affecting" interstate commerce.' 66 Instead,
the gold mine met the alternative jurisdictional basis
of actually being
"engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce."1 67
The Court explained that the mine operators had personally paid to
transport out-of-state employees to the mine.'68 Further, the Court
found it extremely significant that some of the supplies for the mine
had been purchased in other states and brought to Alaska by the operators:
For example, the Government proved that Robertson purchased at least $100,000 worth of equipment and supplies for
use in the mine. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' suggestion,
all of those items were not purchased locally ("drawn generally
from the stream of interstate commerce," 15 F.3d, at 869 (internal quotation marks omitted)); the Government proved that
some of them were purchased in California and transported to
Alaska for use in the mine's operations. Cf. United States v.
American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271, 285
(1975) (allegation that company had made local purchases of
equipment and supplies that were merely manufactured out of
state was insufficient to show that company was "engaged in
commerce" within the meaning of § 7 of the Clayton Act).
The Government also proved that, on more than one occasion,
Robertson sought workers from out of state and brought them
to Alaska to work in the mine. Cf id., at 274. Furthermore,
Robertson, the mine's sole proprietor, took $30,000 worth of
gold, or 15% of the mine's total output, with him out of the

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See id.at 685.
See United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669 (1995).
See id at 671.
Id. at 672.
See id.at 671.
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State.
Whether or not these activities met (and whether or not, to
bring the gold mine within the "affecting commerce" provision
of RICO, they would have to meet) the requirement of substantially affecting interstate commerce, they assuredly brought the
gold mine within § 1962(a)'s alternative criterion of "any enterprise . . . engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce." As
we said in American Building Maintenance, a corporation is
generally "engaged 'in commerce"' when it is itself "directly
engaged in the production, distribution,
or acquisition of goods
69
and services in interstate commerce."
Robertson left no ambiguity: the local purchase of goods which were
originally manufactured out-of-state is not being "in commerce."
Whether the local purchase of goods originally manufactured from outof-state could be sufficient large to substantially affect commerce was a
question that the Court specifically left unresolved.
In the abortion clinic case, there was no evidence before the court
that the operators of the clinic in question had bought goods in another
state and brought them across state lines to the clinic in Wisconsin.
Yet because an abortion clinic will inevitably make local purchases of
goods that once moved in interstate commerce, the Wilson court asserted that clinics are "in commerce" and cited Robertson for support.'7 0
This is misleading jurisprudence.'
In dissent, Judge Coffey pointed to the lack of interstate commerce
jurisdictional language in FACE. When Congress is not regulating economic activity, a jurisdictional requirement should be essential." z In
the case at bar, there was no evidence that any patient, doctor, or protester had traveled interstate.'
While abortion clinics are commercial
enterprises, FACE is not aimed at clinics; it is aimed at protesters, and

169. I, at 671-72.
170. See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
47 (1996).
171. The Wilson opinion is also somewhat sloppy. It refers to "Justice Thomas's Lope dissent"

Wilson, 73 F.3d at 684 n.10.

The Wilson majority chides the Wilson dissent for quot-

ing James Madison as a source of authority for the dissent's position, since the understanding
of the Commerce Clause has changed since Madison's time. See Id. But the Madison quote
used by the Wilson dissent was also used by the Lopez majority, and therefore is a useful

guide to what the Commerce Clause presently means. See United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S.
549, 552 (1995).
172. See Wilson, 73 F.3d at 694.
173. See id. at 689.
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protest is a non-commercial activity. 74 "A federal statute that thus
regulates purely non-commercial activity, while at the same time absent
jurisdictional language, is unprecedented.' 75 (Actually, the unconstitutional Gun-Free School Zones Act appears to be a precedent for such a
combination.) The dissent declined to address what it characterized as
"dicta" about abortion clinics being "in commerce."
As for the congressional findings about the heavy use of interstate
travel for abortions, these amounted to "selective[]" use of "anecdotal
evidence" from a few clinics. 176 Congress had offered nothing to distinguish abortion clinics from schools, churches, houses of prostitution,
and private homes, all of which purchase goods that were once sold
across state lines. FACE failed the non-infinity principle, since it
would allow Congress to ban picketing at schools, brothels, churches,
and private homes. Statistics from Congress itself showed that there
are approximately 1.25 violent acts per state per year at abortion clinics. "I do not understand how slightly more than one act of violence
per state each year provides a rational basis for concluding that interstate commerce is 'substantially affected,' especially since the conduct
outlawed and prosecuted in this case was non-violent.'1 7 While there
was evidence that some abortion patients in the United States have
been harassed, there was no evidence that the number of abortions
performed actually declined.' 78
One other post-Lopez medical case is worth noting. In a case arising in the district court in Maine, a dentist violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) by insisting that he would only fill the tooth of
an HIV-positive patient at a hospital, and not in the dentist's office.'79
The court found the ADA's exercise of interstate commerce power over
the defendant easily justifiable. The activities of all dentists similarly
situated to defendant, in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce, because they buy interstate supplies, process claims to outof-state insurance companies, and attend classes and conferences out of
state. 8' Although the dentist had argued that his decision about where

174.
175.
176.
177.

See id. at 692.
Id.
See id. at 696.
Id. at 697.

178. See id. at 698.
179. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995), a~fd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.
1997). At trial, experts offered conflicting opinions over whether the hospital-only procedure

was a sensible medical precaution.
180. See id. at 593.

See id. at 588-89.

LOPEZ AND THE PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT

1997]

to fill a cavity was not a commercial act, the court replied that "the
way in which he fills cavities ..8 constitutes one of the core economic
activities of any dental office."' '
This determination is of crucial importance to the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act: while an abortion clinic may be a commercial enterprise, is the doctor's deciding which abortion procedure is safer for the
patient a commercial act?'
6. Violence Against Women Act
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA),"' which creates a federal civil cause of action for various
violent and property crimes, if motivated by gender animus. While the
statute invokes the commerce power, there is no jurisdictional predicate.
There were, however, specific findings about an interstate commerce
effect. " '
Upholding the statute, a Connecticut district court compared VAWA
to the statute in Wickard just as the cumulative impact of home-grown
wheat had a substantial effect on interstate wheat sales, the cumulative
effect of women withdrawing from the labor market or producing less,
as a result of violence against them, has a significant effect on interThis reasoning could also support the partial-birth
state commerce.'
abortion ban: the cumulative effect of 5,000 fetuses not being born
every year, and thus not participating in the economy, could be said to
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Moreover, even if the
ban on one method of abortion simply led to another method being
used in most cases, the change in abortion method would result in
different supplies being ordered from interstate medical suppliers, different amounts of money being spent by insurance companies, and so on.

181. It

182. Even pre-Lopez, at least one federal court was unwilling to allow the interstate commerce power be used to control intrastate medicine. In 1983, the federal Food and Drug Administration sought an order to prevent Texas physician Stanislaw Burzynski from treating cancer patients with "antineoplastons," an unapproved cancer therapy created by Dr. Burzynski. A
federal district court granted most of the order, but expressly permitted Dr. Burzynski to continue the treatments within the state of Texas. See United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research
Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1304-05 (5th Cir. 1987).

183. 42 U.S.C. § 1398 (1994).
184. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), reprInted In 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853.

185. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 616 (D. Conn. 1996). See also Doe v. Hartz, 970
F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (upholding VANVA, and relying heavily on congressional findings). But see Clayt~n Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended as 15
U.S.C. § 17) ("the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce").
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But in another VAWA case, Bryzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic &
State University,'86 the court pointed out that Wickard-style aggregation
is, after Lopez, permissible only when the thing being aggregated is
commercial activity.'87 Rape and other interpersonal violence is not a
commercial activity. The Bryzonkala court rejected as irrelevant the
plaintiff's claim that the chain of causation leading to a substantial
impact on interstate commerce was shorter in her case than in Lopez.
"In the end, the important issue is the proximity of the regulated activity to commerce, not the number of steps," and rape was simply too
remote from interstate commerce.' 88 Finally, the rationale implicit in
VAWA violated the non-infinity principle.'89
Bryzonkala involved VAWA's creation of a federal tort, which contained no requirement that the tortious conduct involve interstate conduct. VAWA also contains criminal provisions which require some
kind of state border crossing as an element of the offense. In United
States v. Gluzman,9' a New York City federal district court upheld the
VAWA provision making it a crime to cross state lines to commit
domestic violence. Contrasting this provision with the tort liability
provision of VAWA, which applies to purely intrastate activity, the
court relied on congressional authority to keep the "channels" of interstate commerce free from injurious traffic.' 9'
But a Nebraska court declared unconstitutional VAWA's provision
making it a federal crime to violate a domestic violence protective
order if the perpetrator crosses a state line to commit a violation, or the
victim crosses a state line as a result of the violation.' 92 Regarding the
"channels" theory, "the court notes that there is a large analytical leap
between crossing state lines with things in interstate commerce (such as

186.
187.
188.
189.

935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
See id.at 791.
Id. at 790-91.
See id.at 792-93. See also Chris A. Rauschl, Note, Bryzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic

and State University: Violence Against Women, Commerce, and the Fourteenth Amendment-Defining ConstitutionalLimits, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1601 (1997) (maintaining that VAWA statute is

very similar to the unconstitutional Gun Free School Zones Act; the only difference is that one
involved an actual violent crime, and the other a potential violent crime. While indefensible
under the Commerce Clause, VAWA should be upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment.).
A third VAWA case "reluctantly" upheld VAWA because the court said any congressional
exercise of the commerce power must be upheld if Congress has articulated a rational basis.
See Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
190. 953 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
191. See id. at 89.
192. See 18 U.S.C. § 2262; United States v. Wright, 965 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Neb. 1997).
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falsely made dentures or cattle), and simply traveling across state
lines."193 The "substantial effects" basis for exercise of the interstate
commerce power could not save the statute, because there was no legislative history showing that Congress was concerned about the effects on
interstate commerce of border crossings related to violations of protection orders.'94 Contrasting VAWA with various statutes that had been
cited in Gluzman, the court noted that each of those statutes required
actual movement in interstate commerce; in contrast, the VAWA statute
required only a border crossing, and it is possible to cross a state border without moving in interstate commerce.'95
The VAWA, CSRA, and FACE cases, considered in conjunction
with the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, highlight one of the virtues of
taking federalism seriously: it is value-neutral. The judicial opinions
that would strike down three of the recent legislative triumphs of feminism-FACE, CSRA, and VAWA-are precisely the opinions which
would serve as the strongest authority for a legal challenge to a major
legislative defeat of feminism-the enactment of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.
7. CERCLA
Although the focus of this Article is on the use of the interstate
commerce power to cover intrastate crimes, one non-criminal federal
law has come under fire after Lopez: CERCLA, the federal Superfund
law. 96 That law sets procedures and standards for cleanups of polluted
sites throughout the United States. What makes CERCLA particularly
vulnerable to jurisdictional challenge is that it applies to landfills, industrial sites, and other places, the pollution from which is confined
entirely within a single state.'97 Thus far, one district court has held
CERCLA not to be a valid exercise of the interstate commerce power.
That decision, United States v. Olin Corp.,' 98 was reversed on appeal,
and all other courts have sided with the appellate court.'"

193. Wright, 965 F. Supp. at 1307.
194. See Id at 1312-13.
195. See id at 1313-14. For example, one could simply walk across the border.

Unless

driving an automobile is per se interstate commerce, which seems dubious, then driving across
a state border would not necessarily involve interstate commerce.
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
197. See id
198. 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th. Cir. 1997).

199. See Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098. 1105 (E.D. Tenn. 1996)
(CERCLA does not violate the Commerce Clause); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.
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In Olin, a district court in Alabama found that CERCLA could not
constitutionally be applied to the site at issue in the particular case.
The contaminated industrial facility was no longer active, and thus no
longer engaged in commerce. 0 0 Further, the regulation of real property
was (like education and criminal justice, in Lopez) "traditionally a local
matter falling under the police power of the states.', 2 1'
Finally,
CERCLA lacked a jurisdictional predicate.20 2
The courts which have upheld CERCLA have pointed out that the
statute, among the many things it does, protects groundwater. Although
the contamifiation from a CERCLA site is often confined to the site's
boundaries, rarely is found more than a few miles beyond the site's
boundaries, and virtually never crosses a state boundary, courts have
held that groundwater is among the "things in interstate commerce"
which Congress can regulate. 2 3 The proposition that groundwater is a
thing in interstate commerce is often supported by a citation to the
Supreme Court's Sporhase v. Nebraska.2 4 That case involved a successful challenge, under the dormant Commerce Clause, to a Nebraska
statute requiring a permit to export groundwater outside the state.20 5
The Sporhase Court rejected Nebraska's argument that because the
state of Nebraska legally owned all the groundwater in the state,
groundwater was not an article of commerce. The Court explained that
adopting Nebraska's view would not only exempt Nebraska's actions
from dormant Commerce Clause review, but would also preclude congressional regulation of groundwater:
The multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer-underlying appellants' tracts of land in Colorado and Nebraska, as well as
parts of Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas [footnote
omitted]-confirms the view that there is a significant federal
interest in conservation as well as in fair allocation of this

Nos. 87-CV-920, 91-CV-1332, 1996 WL 637559, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1996) (CERCLA

does not exceed Congress's power under Commerce Clause); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Agway,
Inc., 92-CV-0748, 1996 WL 550128, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1996); United States v. NL
Indus. Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545, 563 (S.D. III. 1996) (under the Commerce Clause, Congress has
the power to regulate improper disposal of hazardous waste under CERCLA).
200. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1532-33.
201. Id. at 1533.
202. See id at 1532.
203. See, e.g., Nova Chems., 945 F. Supp. at 1105 (the Supreme Court has expressly recognized groundwater as an article of commerce); NL Indus., 936 F. Supp. at 557-58.
204. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
205. See generally id.
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diminishing resource... [Nebraska's theory] would also curtail
the affirmative power of Congress to implement its own policies concerning such regulation . . . . Ground water overdraft is
a national problem and Congress has the power to deal with it
on that scale." 6
A dissent by Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, argued that
the majority's discussion of hypothetical congressional power to use the
interstate Commerce Clause to control multistate groundwater depletion
was unnecessary to the resolution of the case.""
Sporhase certainly supports the proposition that Congress can use
the interstate commerce power to deal with the depletion of a large
interstate aquifer such as the Ogallala aquifer. But recognizing that
groundwater, when transferred interstate, can be an article of interstate
commerce does not mean that every drop of groundwater, anywhere in
the United States, is an article of interstate commerce. In the context
of CERCLA, the groundwater at issue is often unconnected to a major
aquifer, and of no commercial interest. Intellectually, citations to
Sporhase are hardly an adequate basis for finding CERCLA's control of
intrastate pollution to actually involve interstate commerce. But like
Scarborough,"' Sporhase provides a simple cite that allows result-oriented courts to avoid complex constitutional questions.2"
In addition to the groundwater rationale, courts have defended
CERCLA under the theory that the pollution was created by an economic activity (typically, as a by-product of manufacturing), and that
pollution, in the Wickard aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.210 This raises an issue not specifically addressed by the Lopez
Court: is aggregation allowed only for commercial activities, or also for
the effects of commercial activities? At least implicitly, the Lopez
opinion suggests the former answer. After all, the possession of guns
near schools is a result of the commercial activity of firearms sales;
nevertheless, it was not permissible to aggregate gun possession near

206. Id at 953-54.

207. See iU at 961-62 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
208. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
209. Cf Denning, supra note 113 (some lower federal courts cite the Supreme Court's leading Second Amendment case for the principle that there is no individual right to keep and bear
arms, even though the case said no such thing).

210. See Nova Chems., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098, 1106 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (the
release of hazardous waste is an economic activity which impacts interstate commerce); United
States v. NL Indus. Inc., 936 F. Supp. 545, 563 (S.D. 111.1996).
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schools in order to find a "substantial" effect on interstate commerce. 21
III.

IS THE ABORTION BAN CONSTITUTIONAL?

Taken together, the majority and concurring opinions in Lopez,
coupled with lower court decisions interpreting Lopez, suggest that the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act should be declared unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, a court that wants to uphold the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act would probably be able to cobble together an opinion doing
so. Much of the case would tum on the level of generality used by
the court. While abortion clinics are commercial enterprises with, in
the aggregate, a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the several
thousand partial-birth abortions performed annually probably do not
substantially affect interstate commerce, especially since many abortion
patients do not cross state lines specifically to obtain a partial-birth
abortion. While the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act does have a jurisdictional element, it is a weak one. Jurisdiction is not limited to cases
where patients cross state lines. In the gun possession cases, the courts
were able to interpret vague jurisdictional language so as to distinguish
interstate commerce cases from non-interstate commerce cases. For
example, the federal gun statute would only apply to cases in which the
possessed gun had crossed states lines. But what rule of jurisdictional
construction could be implemented for the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act? What makes one partial-birth abortion more related to interstate
commerce than another? (The obvious answer is: where a patient has
crossed state lines-but that is not the statute that Congress has
passed.)
A decision upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act would
likely say something like this:
Abortion clinics are commercial enterprises, since they charge a
fee for services, and a doctor's choice of abortion method is
likewise commercial, since abortion is the service for which he
is paid. Abortion clinics buy some supplies from out-of-state,
transact with out-of-state insurance companies, and some patients travel across state lines. Interstate patient travel is especially common for patients seeking partial birth abortions.
Thus, Congress could rationally conclude that abortion clinics
substantially effect interstate commerce. Because the statute has

211. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
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a jurisdictional element (the abortion must be "in or affecting
interstate commerce") the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is
plainly constitutional.
A decision striking the Act might proceed as follows:
While abortion clinics may be commercial enterprises, a doctor's decision about which abortion method to use is not commerce. The relatively small number of partial-birth abortions
performed in the United States every year do not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, even in the aggregate
(and aggregation would only be allowed if the decision about
which type of abortion to perform were commercial). The
women who travel interstate each year to obtain a partial-birth
abortion do not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and Congress could not rationally conclude that they do.
Moreover, medical regulation and family law are both areas of
traditional state concern into which the interstate commerce
power cannot extend. To uphold this statute would be to authorize federal control of all other medical procedures.
It could be argued that the above demonstrates that there is no
definitive answer to how a Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act statute would
fare in a court challenge. Jesse Choper suggests that the uncertain
nature of the boundaries of federal powers is one reason why courts
should avoid enforcing limitations on federal powers, and should instead concentrate exclusively on protecting enumerated rights.2 17 But
saying that there is no definitive answer as to how the Act would fare
is not the same as saying that there is no definitive answer as to how
the Act should fare. Despite some blurriness, the line drawn by Lopez

212. See JEssE H. CHOPER,JUDICAL REVIEV AD THE NATIGOXN POLmCAL PROCESS (1980); Jesse H.
Chdper, The Scope of the National Power Vs -Vls the States: The Dispensability of Judicial

Review, 86 YALE LJ. 1552, 1621 (1977) (the Court should reject judicial review over States'
rights). See also D. Bruce LaPierre, Political Accountability In the National Political Process:
The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 NW. U. L REV. 577, 623 (1985)

(the Court should not decide whether specific state activities should be protected from federal
intervention); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L REv. 543, 559
(1954) ("the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution
to that of Congress in the interest of the States"). Cf Tom Stacy, What's Jrong with Lopez,
44 U. KAN. L. REV. 243, 258-59 (1996) (federalism's only purpose is to empower political majorities; since majorities are adequately represented at both the state and federal levels of government, courts should not enforce federalism).
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does not seem to place federal regulation of abortion within the commerce power.

As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Lopez, indeterminacy is inevitable in any line drawing. Enforcement of the boundaries of the interstate commerce power is no more intellectually difficult than enforcing
the dormant Commerce Clause (which requires a judgment about
whether a state regulation imposes significant negative out-of-state

externalities) as courts have done throughout American history.' 13 In
any case, if judicial line-drawing were the key problem, the simplest
answer is to draw the line according to the text of the Constitution: at
interstate buying and selling of goods. If that is done, the Partial-Birth

Abortion Ban Act, which addresses nothing of the sort, clearly fails.
As Donald Regan notes, there are passages in the majority opinion
in Lopez which suggest that the Gun-Free School Zones Act could have
been saved by "devious" draftsmanship.214
In particular, Congress
could have included specific findings that guns in school zones substantially affect interstate commerce.2" 5 Or, the Court could have added the
requirement that the gun which was possessed must have, at some
point, crossed state lines. Would such drafting have saved the GunFree School Zones Act?2" Would similar drafting (i.e., a ban on per213. See Calabresi, supra note 74, at 804.
The dormant Commerce Clause, interestingly, is one of the few provisions of the Constitution which has never fallen out of judicial favor. While courts at various times have ignored
many of the limits of Article I, § 8 (during most of the 20th century), or left the Bill of
Rights generally unenforced (during most of the 19th century), the dormant Commerce Clause
has developed a reasonably coherent, uncontroversial jurisprudence. Donald Regan, in his 200
page Megillah on the dormant Commerce Clause, describes it as the most boring topic in all of
Constitutional law. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court And State Protectionism: Making
Sense of The Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986). Perhaps the clause's
drab nature helps protect it from the political predators who attack other parts of the Constitution.
214. See Regan, supra note 32, at 567-68.
215. Congress actually did so for the Gun-Free School Zones Act in 1994, see 18 U.S.C. §
922(q) (1994), but the Court found these findings of no use in rescuing a statute that had been
enacted in 1990. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 nA.
216. An answer to this question may be forthcoming. In September 1996, Congress (or more
particularly, a small number of legislative leaders who were cutting deals over a massive Continuing Resolution for federal spending), included in an omnibus spending bill a new version of
the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The new Act requires that the gun must have moved in or
otherwise "affect" interstate commerce. The Act is accompanied by a series of platitudes and
assertions about education, violence, and the economy, which are labeled as "findings." See
104 CONG. REC. H11743 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (discussion regarding H.R. 3610, 104th
Cong. § 657 (1996) and H.R. 4278, 104th Cong. § 657 (1996)).
There were no congressional hearings on the revised Act, and many congresspersons had
no idea that the Act was even contained in the Continuing Resolution, until after the CR had
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forming partial-birth abortions with any equipment that has crossed a
state border) insulate the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act?
Regan suggests that the proper answer is "no." A pack of congressional findings, coupled with the requirement for an "interstate" gun,
would not have changed the fundamental circumstances of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act. In the Act, Congress was overriding state decisions
in two separate areas of traditional state concern (education and crime),
was legislating a national solution where no such solution was required,
and was regulating something which had only the slimmest genuine
connection to interstate commerce.
There are at least some signs that "devious" drafting may no longer
be enough to save a statute that does not deserve to be saved. While
congressional findings about interstate commerce are evaluated on the
rational basis test, the test has grown much more robust in the 1980s
and 1990s. The most recent vigorous rational basis case, Romer v.
Evans,217 threw out a state constitutional amendment which prohibited

local governments and the stati from enacting gay rights laws.218 This
was struck down neither because gays are a protected class, nor because the law gave state sanction to private bias and diminished the
ability of gay rights advocates to participate in the political process.2" 9
Rather, the law was found to lack a rational basis. The State of Colorado, in defending the law, had offered a dozei rationales which the
State argued constituted not only a rational basis, but a compelling state
interest. That not a single one of these were found to constitute even
a rational basis suggests that the rational basis test has become much
more meaningful, at least when courts want it to be. 0 Certainly some
judges on the lower courts have taken the Supreme Court's new vigor
passed, and calls from irate gunowners began to come in.
217. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).

218. Of course gay rights advocates could still gather petitions to place an amendment on the
ballot to repeal Amendment 2, or to enact gay rights law by constitutional amendment.

219. The second theory had been used by the district court in Colorado in striking down the
amendment, while the third theory had been used by the Colorado Supreme Court.

220. Our point in this Article is not to evaluate whether the Romer majority was right about
each one of the proffered bases for the law. Our point is that if a state Attorney General can
offer twelve compelling state interests, and the Supreme Court can find that not even one of
them rises to the level of a rational basis, the rational basis test has some real teeth. See also
Rauschl, supra note 189, at 1611 (noting Lopez's introduction of a heightened rational basis
test); Eric W. Hagen, Note, United States v. Lopez: Artificial Respiration for the Tenth Amend-

ment, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1363, 1385-86 (1996) (also observing change to a stricter test). For
an example of such a "rational-basis-with teeth" test at the state level, see Campbell v.
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (striking down state anti-sodomy law as
irrational).
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about rational basis to heart and have carefully scrutinized governmental
assertions about interstate commerce to ensure that they actually are
rational.22
What about the second "devious" amendment to the Gun-Free
School Zones Act or the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act: a requirement
that something involved must once have crossed a state line? Of
course, a court that wants to uphold the law can just cite
222 and be done with it, if at a certain cost to the court's
Scarborough,
self-esteem. But, as the Bishop dissent points out, Scarborough interprets a statute, not the Commerce Clause.223
More fundamentally, merely asking for an irrelevant state line
crossing and nothing more (except for some dubious "findings") is to
do precisely what the Lopez majority says Congress cannot do: turn the
Commerce Clause into a general police power. We hope that Lopez
was based on more than Congress's failure to announce a legal fiction.
"Simon Says" is a game for children, not a jurisprudence.
Moreover, even if Scarborough had been a Commerce Clause case,
it does not stand for the proposition that any line crossing is sufficient.
No one suggests that the federal gun possession statute would be upheld if it were based on a requirement that while possessing the gun
the defendant was wearing clothes which had been shipped in interstate
commerce. This is true even though the wearing of the interstate
clothes is, for all practical purposes, a condition precedent'to actually
possessing the gun. Clothes are necessary to hide the gun, and people
who are not wearing clothes are unlikely to leave their homes, or to
deal with most other persons. Thus, it is only when clothed that most
gun criminals present any kind of threat to public safety. Further, as
the Ninth Circuit observed when striking the application of the federal
arson statute to a residential insurance fraud arson, simply because an
item has once been shipped in interstate commerce, Congress cannot
regulate it for eternity.224

221. See supra text accompanying notes 122-33, 172-75 & 186-89.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
223. See supra text accompanying note 132.

224. See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing United
States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 1993)). See also United States v. Cortner, 834 F.
Supp. 242, 243 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th

Cir. 1994) ("To say ...that because something once traveled interstate it remains in interstate
commerce after coming to rest in a given state, is sheer sophistry. This Court, at one time,
owned a 1932 Ford which was manufactured in Detroit in the year 1931 and transported to the
state of Tennessee. It remained in Tennessee thereafter. Now if this car were hijacked today,
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Despite what certain post-Lopez cases have done, the fact that one
can go into a building and find inside important objects that were once
transported across state lines does not mean that the interstate commerce power can extend to every activity in the building. For example, when the federal government tried to impose the Fair Labor Standards Act on a battered women's shelter, the government argued that
the shelter gave the battered women donated goods that had previously
traveled in interstate commerce.m The district court in North Carolina,
however, held that the shelter was not in engaged in "commerce or
production of goods for commerce" nor was the shelter "connected with
a commercial transaction which substantially affects interstate commerce." 226 As Lopez announces,

The mere presence of a jurisdictional element, however, does
not in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny
under the Commerce Clause, or render it per se constitutional.
To the contrary, courts must inquire further to determine whether the jurisdictional element has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. 7
So although the Lopez Court pointed to the absence of a jurisdictional
requirement and legislative findings in the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
it is not at all clear that devious drafting would have saved the statute.
Gun possession is still not commercial, and any rationale for guns within a thousand feet of schools having a substantial effect on commerce
is a rationale for federal control over all education and all criminal law.
Regan suggests that the power to "regulate commerce among the
several states" be read as a broad grant of power to Congress to regulate on any issue of national concern for which the states are individually incompetent. 8 As Regan concedes, this is very far from a "literal" reading of the interstate commerce power. 229 Such a broad power,
had it actually been included in the Constitution, would have aroused
furious objections by Anti-Federalists. Considering the narrow margins

some sixty years later, is it still in interstate commerce?").
225. See Murray v. Reach of Jackson County, Inc., 908 F.
226. I/ Since the shelter was non-commercial, the court
tered women's shelters in the United States together, to see
interstate commerce. See id; United States v. Lopez. 514
only permissible for commercial activities).
227. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
228. See Regan, supra note 32, at 577.

229. See id at 571.

Supp. 337, 340 (N/.D.N.C. 1995).
properly did not aggregate all batif they had a substantial effect on
U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (aggregation
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of ratification in several states, it is possible that, had the state conventions foreseen that the commerce power would grow into Regan's "national necessity" power, the entire Constitution would have been rejected. Broad as Regan's theory is, it is actually much narrower than
some pre-Lopez interpretations of the commerce power. Consistent
with the Lopez holding, Regan's theory also means that one cannot
defend congressional legislation merely by pointing out that the problem is "national" in the sense of taking place all over the nation, or
that the problem has large economic consequences.23
As applied to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, Regan's theory
would find the Act unconstitutional. States are not at all incompetent
to regulate partial-birth abortions; Roe v. Wade left state power over
third-trimester abortions undisturbed, so long as a third-trimester law
includes exceptions for the life or health of the mother.2"' If, one day,
48 states have enacted partial-birth abortion bans that pass constitutional
muster, while Colorado and Hawaii (for example) run a thriving abortion business providing legal partial-birth abortions to women from the
other 48 states, Regan's theory would make it legitimate for the Congress to act.232
As this Article is written, a minority of states have banned such
abortions; 233 two of the bans have been blocked by federal courts, since
the bans provided no exception for maternal health or life, and since
the bans imposed major restrictions on second-trimester abortions, con230. In a decision holding unconstitutional the Violence Against Women Act (which was
defended precisely on the basis that violence occurs against women all over the country, and
such violence has large economic consequences), the court wrote:
Plaintiff uses "effects on the national economy" interchangeably with "effects on

interstate commerce." This is wrong. Undoubtedly effects on the national economy
in turn affect interstate commerce. Such a chain of causation alone, however, is
insufficient to bring an act within the purview of the commerce power. If such a
chain of causation existed, Congress's power would extend to an unbounded extreme.
Defendants point out that facts show that insomnia costs the United States $15 billion a year (citing 2 Nat'l Comm'n on Sleep Disorders Research, Wake Up America:
A National Sleep Alert (submitted to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Health

and Human Services), 125-33 (1994)). This is as much as the yearly cost of domestic abuse.
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 792-93 (W.D. Va. 1996),
231. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
232. The example Regan discusses involves lottery tickets, but the similar analysis would

apply to abortion.

See Regan, supra note 32, at 576.

233. The states with bans are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah. See Katharine Q. Selye, States Outlaw Late Abortions as a Federal Ban Faces a Veto, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at Al; H.R.
5889 (Mich. 1996); H.R. 135 (Ohio 1995).
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stituting an "undue burden" on the right to abortion. 234 The statutes in
the other states appear vulnerable to similar challenges.
As Steven Calabresi notes, federalism makes a substantial contribution to domestic tranquility in the United States by assuring that many
contentious, divisive moral issues may have a multiplicity of resolutions, rather than a winner-take-all decision at the national level. 5
This is certainly true on abortion, the hottest of hot buttons in American politics. It is also true on gun control, medical marijuana, and
many other emotional issues. The legitimate concerns raised by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor about stability are, in the long run, best addressed by vigorous judicial enforcement of federalism, which will
avoid the destabilizing effects of imposing a single national answer to
fractious questions.
CONCLUSION

To any person not familiar with the Commerce Clause sophistries
of twentieth century jurisprudence, the proposed Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act begins with an oxymoron: "[a]ny physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth
abortion . . . ." Unless a physician is operating a mobile abortion
clinic on the Metroliner, it is not really possible to perform an abortion
"inor affecting interstate or foreign commerce."
Some cynics suggest that limitations on federal power (or enforcement of states' rights, the other side of the coin) are invoked by individuals and groups "only when a national program seems to them
harmful to their interests." 6 If there is a lesson to be had from a review of the Commerce Clause aspects of federal abortion legislation, it
may be that consistency in constitutional argument is an
underappreciated, and underpracticed, virtue. At least the silence of
pro-choice forces is intellectually consistent: believing in general that

234. See Evans v. Kelly, No. 97-CV71246-DT, 1997 WL 471906 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 1997);
Women's Med. Prof. Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1059-60 (S.D. Ohio, 1995).

235. See Calabresi, supra note 74, at 768-69.
236. RIcHARD H. LEACH, AhEiICAN FEDERALUSM 38 (1970).
As authois, we perhaps should note that taking Lope seriously probably prohibits at least
one item of federal legislation which, as a substantive matter, we whole-heartedly support: a

new version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") grounded on the interstate
commerce power. (The RFRA was originally enacted under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a basis which was recently found unconstitutional. See City of Boeme v. Flores,
117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)).
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the federal government is restricted only by the Bill of Rights and by
doctrines, like the right of privacy, that are derived from the Bill of
Rights, pro-choice advocates have for the most part ignored potentially
useful arguments based on limited federal power.237 Indeed, the idea
that Congress might not have the power (subject to Bill of Rights limits) to regulate important personal choices by women and physicians
everywhere in the United States does not seem to have even occurred
to most pro-choice legislators and activists. Those to whom it may
have occurred may also have simply assumed that because limited government is championed (verbally at least) by the right, it must somehow tend to produce "right wing" results. Indeed, it would not be
intellectually consistent to use Lopez to get rid of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, while continuing to use limitless commerce power
rationales to defend other, more politically correct legislation, including
FACE and VAWA. Thus, in the case of the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act, zealous advocacy has apparently taken a back seat, as abortion advocates decline to use what might be their strongest argument.
Such intellectual consistency is certainly absent from some of the
most prominent advocates on the other side of the debate. Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois, one of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act's most vigorous supporters, was also co-sponsor of the ShadeggPombo "Enumerated Powers Act," which seeks to limit the federal
government to its constitutionally defined role.23 Inconsistently, Rep.
Hyde dismisses state authority arguments as "a debating point," ranking
at two in importance on a scale of one to ten. "You gotta do what
you gotta do," he added.23 And the Senate counterpart to the Shadegg
bill, the "Tenth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1996 '' 24o was co-spon237. But see 141 CONG. REC. HI 1612 (statement of Rep. Frank) ("It says this only involves

abortions as crimes which are in or affect interstate or foreign commerce.

How does a woman

know she is in foreign commerce or interstate commerce? Is her head in Canada and her feet
in Detroit? What kind of nonsense are we talking about?").
238. See H.R. 292, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2270, 104th Cong. (1995).
Rep. Hyde cosponsored the 1995 bill, but has not signed on as a co-sponsor of the 1997 bill. The bill requires that each act of Congress include a clause specifying the constitutional authority for the
act. In January 1997, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a rule requiring the report
for each bill to cite the bill's constitutional authority. See Kerry Jackson, Making the Questionable Constitutional, FYI, May 16, 1997, at 13.
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, while it does not have an authority clause, does have
a jurisdictional clause that demonstrates which congressional power is being used. But the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act certainly violates the spirit of the Enumerated Powers Act, since if
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is valid, then there are no real limitations on "enumerated"
congressional powers.
239. Adam Clymer, Switching Sides on States' Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, June 1, 1997, at IV:I,
240. S. 1629, 104th Cong. (1996). The bill requires legislation to cite the specific constitu-
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sored by Robert Dole-famous for his constant invocation of the Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act on the Presidential campaign circuit, where he
has also took to pulling the Tenth Amendment out of his shirt pocket
(as if he were Justice Black, who carried the Constitution around in his
front pocket at all times).24
Of course, not all congressional advocates of the Partial-Birth Abortion ban are intellectually inconsistent. Some have never objected in
principle to federalizing everything that Congress wants to federalize.
Other legislators may recognize that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
is indefensible under its stated basis, the Interstate Commerce Clause,
but vote for the bill anyway, because they believe such legislation is
within congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.242
But generally speaking, it is hardly consistent for legislators to
proclaim their affection for the doctrine of enumerated powers in general, and Lopez in particular, and then to turn around and push legislation
which violates the spirit and the letter of both. Such behavior certainly
undermines Republicans' claim that they are serious about restoring the
federal government to its constitutional role.
There is little in the way of final authority in constitutional debate,243 but it is not asking too much that arguments at least be consistent. Some of the most prominent defenders of limited federal government, however, have shown themselves to be utterly inconsistent, trumpeting the virtues of enumerated powers and the Tenth Amendment
when it suits their purposes, then asserting effectively unlimited federal
powers when that suits their purposes better. One might be tempted to
respond by giving up on the notion of limited federal government entirely. Yet that has its own perils.
It has been suggested elsewhere that limited government at the

tional authority on which it is based; to include specific findings as to why Congress has great-

er institutional competence than the states regarding the subject matter of the legislation; and to
include a specific statement of congressional intent if the bill is to preempt state or local law.
As far as we can discover, no congressional proponent of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
has suggested any reason why Congress has greater competence to regulate abortion than do the
states.
241. See Morton I Horowitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit ofJustice, 50 \VASH. & LEE
L. REV. 5, 10-11 (1993) ("An evangelical Baptist who was outside of the mainstream of so-

phisticated eastern establishment legal thought, Black carried the Constitution in his pocket the
way his Baptist forbearers carried the Bible in their pockets.").
242. Rep. Bob Schaffer (D.Colo.) so stated at a July 1996 congressional candidates debate in
Golden, Colorado, in response to a question from David Kopel.
243. See Glenn H. Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L REV. 110, 114 (1991).
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federal level plays an important role in protecting against the rise of
special interest power.244 And the growth of special interest power
poses a significant threat to individual liberties-and to governmental
legitimacy-as an unlimited federal government is both more attractive
for special interests to lobby, and more dangerous to freedoms. The
case which did the most to expand the interstate commerce power
(Jones & Laughlin Steel) and the case which reminds us that the power
is not infinite (Lopez) both instruct us that the Interstate Commerce
Clause may not be interpreted so as to allow "a completely centralized
government."245 In a determination to prevent "a completely centralized
government," the two cases are entirely consistent with the text of the
Constitution and its original intent. The Framers, after all, certainly
considered the limited nature of the federal government to be the primary protector of individual freedom; the Bill of Rights was merely a
back-up system. We have now reached the point at which the back-up
system is virtually all that is left of the original liberty-protecting
scheme. And as NASA engineers say, once you start relying on the
back-ups, you're already in trouble.246
Even more important, an overweening federal government stretched
beyond its constitutional limitations lacks fundamental legitimacy. Legitimacy, after all, comes not from the possession of the badges of
office, but from the rightful possession of the office and the rightful
use of its authority. It has not escaped the attention of many Americans that the federal government has exceeded its constitutional bounds,
and that realization plays a major part in the widespread hostility toward the federal government that is manifest today.247 The Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act, if passed into law, would simply be another act of
illegitimate power, undertaken for political reasons. Those affected by
it would likely regard it as such.
While we have used the partial-birth abortion issue as an exemplar,
most of the same points apply to most other proposed federal regulations of abortion. Such restrictions, even if enacted by Congress and
upheld by sophistic judicial reasoning, are illegitimate. The details of
244. See Glenn H. Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1635, 1651-54

(1995).
245. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555-57 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
246. Reynolds' personal conversation with a NASA engineer.
247. See Randy E. Barnett, Guns, Militias, and Oklahoma City, 62 TENN. L. REv. 443, 457-

59 (1995) (describing growth of federal government beyond constitutional bounds and consequent loss of legitimacy).
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how a woman in one state obtains an abortion in that same state are
not properly the subject of congressional power to regulate interstate

commerce. Nor is the simple possession of a machine gun. Nor are
congressional laws on other subjects, such as the intrastate possession
of drugs or guns, the perpetration of non-commercial crimes against

women or men, child support enforcement, or the picketing of abortion
clinics.248
The sponsorship of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, as
many other criminal laws about intrastate conduct, by "limited
ment" advocates also suggests that constitutional theories that
the political branches to police themselves are unrealistic. 49
time, courts policed congressional usurpation of power, by

well as
governrely on
At one
striking

down actions that exceeded Congress's finite authority." ° In 1985, a
five-four majority of the Supreme Court said that the Court should get

out of the business of enforcing the boundaries of federalism.2"

The

political process would enforce these boundaries of its own accord, sup-

posedly. 2 In dissent, Justice O'Connor remarked at the foolishness of
relying on Congress's "underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint." '
Justice O'Connor's dissent predicted "that this Court will in time again

assume its constitutional responsibility,"

and her prediction has proven

correct. Again and again in the last several terms, the Court has hand-

ed down decisions limiting the reach of the interstate Commerce Clause
and protecting the state/federal separation of powers.2"

Thus, even in

248. Nor are gambling and tobacco, which happen to be two major targets for federalization
by over-enthusiastic prohibitionists.
249. See generally CHOPER, supra note 212.
250. See, e.g., Schechter Poultzy Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (unanimously
striking down law comprehensively regulating wages and prices); In re Hef, 197 U.S. 488
(1905) (voiding ban on intrastate sale of liquor to Indians), overruled by United States v. Nice,
241 U.S. 591 (1916); United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 89 (1878) (trademark statute void
because it attempted to control purely intrastate commercial transactions); United States v.
DeWitt, 76 U.S. 41, 44 (1870) (invalidating nationwide ban on certain fuels; the interstate
Commerce Clause "has always been understood as limited solely to its terms; and as a virtual
denial of any power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate states").
251. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (applying the Fair
Labor Standards Act to state employees is not destructive of state sovereignty or violative of
any constitutional provision).
252. See id at 547-55.
253. Id at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
254. Id at 589.
255. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (Congress may not force local
law enforcement to perform federal checks on handgun buyers); Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment limit on commerce power); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Congress may not force states to participate in nuclear
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first-year Constitutional law classes, it has become respectable to suggest that federal power is finite, and the Court has a role in keeping it
that way.
In Conan Doyle's famous story, it was the fact that the dog didn't
bark that allowed Sherlock Holmes to solve the mystery. 56 The dog
that hasn't barked in the debate over the Partial Birth Abortion Ban
Act is the limited power of the federal government to pass legislation
based primarily on one group's moral views. What mystery does this
silence solve? Alas, in our case it is no mystery at all. The dog has
not barked because the political classes, on both the left and the right,
have no interest in limiting the power of the federal government when
limitations might constrain their own actions.
That would not have surprised the Framers of our Constitution,
who knew about the tendency of ruling classes to view their own power expansively. As Founding Mother Abigail Adams observed, "power,
whether vested in many or a few, is ever grasping, and, like the grave,
cries 'Give, give!""" What might have surprised the Framers is that
such an expansive view of federal power could obtain such wide currency among the courts. Lopez suggests that some courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, are beginning to recognize that limited
federal power is an important part of our constitutional scheme, and an
important protector of freedom. Whatever one thinks about abortion,
this is a salutary development for liberty.

waste handling system).

256. Sherlock Holmes explained:
Before deciding that question I had grasped the significance of the silence of the
dog, for one true inference invariably suggests others. The Simpson incident had
shown me that a dog was kept in the stables, and yet, though someone had been in
and had fetched out a horse, he had not barked enough to arouse the two lads in

the loft. Obviously the midnight visitor was someone whom the dog knew well.
Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES, available at
<http'//www.literature.org/Works/Arthur-Conan-Doyle/ilver.blaze.html>.
257. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Nov. 27, 1775), in L.H. ButrrERFIELD, THE
BOOK OF ABIGAIL AND JOHN: SELECTED LTTrEnS OF THE ADAMS FAMILY, 1762-1784, at 113 (1975).

